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ABSTRACT

Hough, Alexander R. Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2021.
Understanding and Improving Coordination Efficiency in the Minimum Effort Game:
Counterfactual- and Behavioral-Based Nudging and Cognitive Modeling

Individuals often need to coordinate with others to pursue and achieve goals.
However, individuals often fail to coordinate on any choice or on efficient (i.e., higher
reward) choices. Researchers addressing coordination failure often used invasive methods
ranging in complexity and generalizability with minimal success. There are also no clear
measures for coordination behaviors. Here, I used a more parsimonious and generalizable
method: Using counterfactuals (i.e., hypothetical outcomes had they or other players
chosen differently) to nudge (i.e., indirectly guide and allow for free choice) individuals
towards choosing options that are more likely to result in efficient coordination. I
simulated a coordination situation using a modified minimum effort game (MEG) with
counterfactual manipulations and included effort-related trait measures. Participants
played the MEG with other humans or bots based on a mathematical model from game
theory. In the first experiment I used neutral bidirectional counterfactuals (i.e., outcomes
if own choice or minimum was one lower or higher). I found higher coordination
efficiency compared to previous experiments and no relationships with trait measures in
human or bot groups. In the second experiment with only bot groups, I found evidence
that those receiving upward counterfactuals performed better than those receiving
downward. There was also evidence that one human can encourage other players to make
iii

more efficient choices with behavior-based nudging (i.e., signaling) regardless of
counterfactual condition. Since bot behavior was artificial, I developed a cognitive model
within ACT-R that was able to approximate human behavior and processing in the MEG
better than competing models. This dissertation contributed to the coordination literature
by introducing: 1) novel methods to measure coordination, efficiency, and signaling, 2) a
novel method to nudge individuals towards coordination efficiency, and 3) a novel model
of coordination within a cognitive architecture that better explains behavior, cognitive
processes, and group dynamics.
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I.

Introduction

The goal of this dissertation was to better understand coordination efficiency, if
and how an information manipulation influences coordination efficiency, and the
interplay between the manipulation and dynamic repeated interaction with other players.
To achieve these goals, a new technique was explored in two experiments within the
Minimum Effort Game (MEG; van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990) to test the
effectiveness of a parsimonious information intervention (i.e., counterfactuals) designed
to nudge individuals towards choices that could lead to better coordination with more
efficient outcomes. The two experiments utilized both behavioral and model-based data.
The MEG, a performance-based effort avoidance measure called the Demand Selection
Task (DST; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Juvina et al., 2018), and effort
related trait measures were used to collect behavioral data. For the model-based data, a
learning model from game theory, the Experience Weighted Attraction model, (EWA;
Camerer & Ho, 1999) was extended to correspond to the current game structure, serve as
a synthetic player, and explore the behavioral data from the MEG. In addition, a
cognitive model was developed and implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture
after the first two experiments due to the inadequacy of the extended EWA model to
simulate and explain human behavior.
Coordination is an interdisciplinary domain that spans across fields such as
biology, economics, computer science, and of course, psychology. Malone and Crowston
(1994) defined coordination as “managing dependencies between activities” (p. 4), where
1

dependences include things like sharing resources, assigning tasks, and working
around constraints. In humans, coordination often involves emotion, motivation,
incentives, and biases at the individual or group level (Malone & Crowston, 1994). This
dissertation is focused on a type of coordination and context within the larger
coordination domain: group coordination in humans where outcomes are a function of
behavior at the individual and group level, resulting in unique or asymmetric outcomes
for each individual. Groups of individuals often fail to coordinate (i.e., coordination
failure) in this type of situation (Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1990, 1994,
Camerer, 2003, Riechmann & Weimann, 2008; van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991), which is
often attributed to the lack of a coordinating device or focal point that increases the
saliency of efficient equilibria equally for all players (Blume et al., 1998; Mehta et al.,
1994). This failure includes two related, but distinct phenomena: the failure to coordinate
and the failure to coordinate on efficient equilibria (Riechmann & Weimann, 2008). This
distinction is often ambiguous in the literature, so an explicit distinction is made here.
Coordination concerns the degree players settle or converge on a single equilibrium or
choice. In this dissertation, coordination is approximated by calculating variance or the
range of the choice distribution within the group (e.g., lower means better coordination).
Players can coordinate on any equilibrium or choice. On the other hand, coordination
efficiency (i.e., coordination on efficient equilibria) typically refers to how close this
equilibrium is the highest possible payoff and can be considered as a point on a
continuum between the lowest and highest possible payoffs.
A degree of coordination often occurs over time, making reaching efficiency and
increasing efficiency after stabilization at inefficient equilibria more interesting topics of
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study (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006; Brandts, Cooper, & Weber, 2014; Brandts, Cooper,
Fatas, & Qi, 2015; Chaudhuri, Schotter, & Sopher, 2009; van Huyck et al., 1991). Several
techniques have been applied to address these two issues with varying degrees of cost,
effort, and effectiveness (Brandts et al., 2014, 2015; Cooper et al., 1990; Sahin, Eckel, &
Komai, 2015; Weber, 2001; van Huyck et al., 1990; van Huyck, Gillette, & Battalio,
1992; van Huyck, Battalio, & Beil, 1993). These two issues were addressed in this
dissertation using the MEG as a simulated asymmetric coordination scenario where: 1)
individuals make choices simultaneously or without knowledge of other’s choices, 2)
they cannot communicate beyond making choices, and 3) the resulting outcomes are
asymmetric or unique for each individual depending on their choice, an order statistic
(e.g., mean, median, or minimum), and the choices of the other members of the group. In
the MEG, outcomes are determined by the “weak link” or minimum choice of the group.
Players typically converge towards the minimum choice resulting in inefficient outcomes
for all members of the group. This type of coordination situation was chosen because it is
very challenging to achieve coordination without an explicit coordination device or
salient focal point (Blume, DeJong, Kim, & Sprinkle, 1998; Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden,
1994) and other players choices, particularly the lowest or weakest choices, can become
the focal point and influence other players to coordinate on an inefficient choice (Brandts
et al., 2014, 2015; van Huyck et al., 1990). Increasing coordination efficiency in this
particularly difficult setting would be promising and could potentially generalize to other
asymmetric coordination situations as well. Previous research used several techniques
aimed at increasing coordination efficiency and some were successful to a degree;
however, they involve changing the coordination situation, require substantial effort, and
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only work when everything is “just right”. For instance, Brandts and colleagues (Brandts
et al., 2014, 2015) found that allowing a leader to help other players could improve
coordination efficiency, however, if this help was taken away too early it was actually
worse than no help at all. In addition, leaders often stopped helping because it incurred a
cost that was higher than the benefit.
In this dissertation, I used a new technique to improve efficiency: providing
individuals with counterfactuals. A counterfactual is defined as a specific forgone
outcome that could have occurred if a different choice was made (e.g., Byrne, 2016;
Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Counterfactuals can focus on aspects of a situation that are
within one’s control (e.g., one’s own choices) and/or outside of one’s control (e.g.,
choices of other’s that affect your outcome), and tend to involve how to improve future
outcomes (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Roese, 1997; Roese, Hur,
& Pennington, 1999). According to previous research on counterfactual thinking and
coordination in game theory, these counterfactuals could influence coordination and
coordination efficiency. For instance, when counterfactuals highlight a better
hypothetical outcome, they may indirectly nudge or guide individuals (Thaler, Sunstein,
& Balz, 2013) towards choices that could lead to more efficient coordination. The
following sections provide background literature on coordination games, effort-related
preferences, and nudging techniques (i.e., information-based counterfactuals and
behavior-based signaling).
MEG and Coordination
The MEG involves multiple players who select a level of effort between one and
seven. All player payoffs are determined by the lowest effort level or minimum in the
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group. The payoff matrix (Table 1) is set up so that coordinating on the minimum results
in higher payoffs, particularly when coordinating at higher levels of effort.
Table 1

Player's Effort Choice

MEG payoff matrix (Adapted from van Huyck et al., 1991)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

1
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

2
80
70
60
50
40
30

Minimum Effort Choice in Group
3
4
5

90
80
70
60
50

100
90
80
70

110
100
90

6

7

120
110

130

The game structure provides seven coordination points or Nash equilibria (Nash,
1951) which are represented diagonally (in bold) from the payoff of 70 to 130. A Nash
equilibrium specifies what a rational player should select to maximize their own utility or
payoff according to all the other strategies available and the choices made by other
players (Camerer, 2003). These Nash equilibria are “Pareto ranked” from one to seven
(from left to right) according to their payoff. A Pareto equilibrium is a strategy that
essentially maximizes the sum of payoffs for all players without increasing the payoff of
one player at the expense of another (Camerer, 2003). In the MEG, there is some
ambiguity regarding efficiency. Here, I explicitly distinguish between two types: local
and global efficiency. I define local efficiency as maximizing the payoff for a given
round (i.e., Nash equilibrium) by selecting the minimum. This is a short-sighted approach
and is optimal for one round of play. I define global efficiency as striving for the highest
possible payoff by choosing closer to 7. This is more similar to a Pareto equilibrium, as it
considers the payoffs of everyone in the group. It is a more long-term strategy and is
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more ideal when players are willing to take some risk by choosing higher in order to
bring up the payoffs of everyone in the group. The previous references to efficiency are
better aligned with global efficiency and since it is the focus of this dissertation, the term
efficiency will continue to refer to this global efficiency.
There are two salient choice options at the start or first round of the MEG: a
payoff dominant choice (i.e., seven) that could result in both the highest payoff (i.e., 130)
or the lowest possible payoff (10) and a risk dominant choice (i.e., one) that does not
depend on other player’s choices and always results in a guaranteed payoff (i.e., 70). van
Huyck et al. (1990, 1991) demonstrated that players start the game using strategies such
as the payoff dominant and risk dominant choices, but learning occurs during the game,
which causes deviation from these initial strategies. Players often choose somewhere
between the payoff and risk dominant choice in the first round, and in subsequent rounds,
the minimum effort may become a third salient focal point as it determines payoffs.

Figure 1. Observed negative trend in effort from Leng et al. (2018) and convergence
towards one from van Huyck et al. (1990). Error bars for van Huyck et al. (2010) are 95%
confidence intervals. Note: the trend for Leng et al. (2018) is reproduced from first and
last round effort choice data.
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This is a simple explanation for the frequently observed negative trend in effort
over time (Leng, Frieson, Kalayci, & Man, 2018, van Huyck et al. 1991) that often results
in convergence towards one (van Huyck et al., 1990) in ten rounds of play (Figure 1).
In three different variations where players were given feedback about the
minimum for each round, van Huyck et al. (1990) found outcomes are sensitive to
payoffs, group size, and the potential risk or cost of allocating more effort than the
minimum. However, players were only given the minimum choice per round and were
not able to determine what other players were choosing. Therefore, players might assume
all other players choose the minimum. van Huyck et al. (1990) addressed this issue by
including a condition where players were given complete outcome information (i.e., the
complete distribution of player choices and the minimum), however, this had little effect
and players still converged to one. This finding was replicated and reported in Camerer
and Ho (1998). In addition, Leng, et al. (2018) found additional outcome information and
continuous time treatments with dynamic choices had no significant effects on
coordination behaviors beyond only giving the minimum as feedback in typical discrete
time with players choosing simultaneously.
The coordination game literature provides three additional points relevant to the
MEG and this dissertation. First, players initial choice is very important, as it is very
difficult to improve efficiency once it has already converged on an inefficient option
(e.g., Chaudhuri et al., 2009; van Huyck et al., 1990). Typically, groups of players have a
higher dispersion of first round choices compared to later rounds (e.g., Camerer & Ho,
1998; van Huyck et al., 1990), suggesting individual differences in strategies or
preferences. Players might use previous strategies that are inappropriate for the current
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context and even if they adapt to the current environment (Cooper & van Huyck 2018),
that previous strategy or rule likely serve as a reference point (Costa-Gomes et al., 2009).
Second, people may have effort preferences or evaluate the benefits of applying
effort in a given situation. In game theory, steps of reasoning refer to the extent of
thinking prior to making a decision (Camerer, 2003). For instance, thinking a player
might do “X” is one step and considering they might do “Y” because they think you are
going to do “Y” involves two steps. Engaging in these steps of reasoning is taxing on
memory and may be perceived as aversive or costly (Beard & Beil, 1994; Duffy & Nagel,
1997; Ho et al., 1998; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Nagel, 1995; Rubinstein, 1989;
Schotter, Weigelt, & Wilson, 1994; van Huyck, Wildenthal, & Battalio, 2002). In terms
of efficiency, one step of reasoning is a good strategy as other player’s behavior is
difficult to predict and people are sensitive to wasted effort (Camerer, 2003; Haruvy &
Stahl, 2007; Ho & Weigelt, 1996). In repeated play, players might apply little effort
towards initial choices, in order to size up the group before applying too much effort.
Third, players might attempt to signal cooperation at an efficient equilibrium by
choosing higher effort than other players and may continue to do so as long as it is
effective (Charness, Gneezy, & Henderson (2018). Interestingly, this signaling is more
effective when it is costly to the signaler (e.g., time, effort, or currency) and other players
are aware of the cost the signaler is paying to bring up efficiency (Spence, 1978). This is
similar to Brandts et al.’s (2014, 2015) leadership experiments where leaders can improve
efficacy by helping players (i.e., paying a cost) after they converged on an inefficient
equilibrium. However, their experiments utilized communication or the leader publicly
selecting first and if leaders stopped helping too early, it was actually worse than not
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helping at all, suggesting signaling needs to be persistent to be effective. Rather than
trying to improve efficiency, players might see the risk in choosing higher effort (e.g.,
Cachon & Camerer, 1996) or might negatively reciprocate when other player(s) choose a
lower level of effort than they do (e.g., Offerman, 2002).
Coordination, coordination efficiency, and these additional points from the
coordination literature are difficult to address in the MEG, because it involves a large
number of players and possible equilibria. Previous MEG experiments (Bortolotti,
Devetag, & Ortmann, 2016; Leng et al., 2018; van Huyck, 1990, 1991) typically focused
solely on effort and minimum effort across rounds to analyze efficiency and signaling
behavior. Leng et al. (2018) went a step further by comparing the frequency of individual
effort changes and group minimum changes, and identified signaling as alternating
between the minimum and higher effort. They found that this signaling behavior can
increase the group minimum, which they label as a measure of efficiency. However, the
increase is small at best or non-existent depending on how much information is provided
about other player choices. Similar to van Huyck (1990, 1991), they also found that the
minimum serves as a focal point early on and serves as an anchor for subsequent rounds.
Bortolotti et al. (2016) also made some methodological contributions by identifying and
analyzing the behavior of weak links within groups (i.e., the player setting the minimum)
to assess their influence on the group’s coordination efficiency. They found weak links
were the source of coordination failure early in the game. Despite the contributions from
Borotolli et al. (2016) and Leng et al. (2018), several methodological gaps remain. There
are no well-defined methods to measure coordination, coordination efficiency, and
signaling. Analyses also leave out payoffs as a dependent measure and do not address the
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possible influence of pre-game preferences for influencing initial effort choices that set
the stage for subsequent coordination. Furthermore, research has not analyzed behavior at
the aggregate, group, and individual levels. These methodological issues are addressed in
this dissertation, particularly in the first experiment, to better understand coordination
behaviors, methods to measure them, and to gather converging evidence from different
levels of analysis.
Another unresolved issue in the MEG is effort. There is no actual effort and is
therefore difficult to relate to effort-related preferences and signaling behavior that
involves costs. It is worth noting that a recent study used actual effort in a MEG
(Bortolotti et al., 2016), however, there was substantial deviation from the typical game
structure and effort was based on the number of errors made during an individual coin
sorting task. Measuring errors is more related to the ability to perform a coin sorting task
than it is willingness to expend effort, which was the focus of the original MEG. To
address this effort problem and gaps in measuring and analyzing coordination efficiency,
effort preferences, and signaling, a real-effort MEG (referred to as the REMEG) was
developed for this dissertation.
In the REMEG, players selected a level of effort and then completed an arithmetic
problem that involved adding single digit numbers without the use of a calculator or
paper and pencil. The base problem for the effort level of 1 was adding two numbers and
each additional effort unit added one additional number to the problem (i.e., max of eight
numbers for effort selection of 7). Incorrect solutions resulted in a payoff reduction for
the individual instead of the group to keep willingness to expend effort separate from
errors. After making a choice and giving an answer to the arithmetic problem, players
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received results. Similar to the full information condition from van Huyck (1990), players
were given information about other players choices and their payoffs. This was meant to
complement the counterfactual manipulation so that players could assess whether other
players were responding to the counterfactuals or any resulting signaling behavior. The
REMEG is discussed in greater detail later as part of the experimental method.
As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation involves modeling work in
addition to behavioral experiments. Models provide additional data and help explain
behavioral data in experiments. One such model is Camerer and Ho’s (1999) experience
weighted attraction model (i.e., EWA), that was developed to explain behavior in a
variety of games based on learning. EWA can fit and predict data for a wide array of
games in game theory, including the MEG, better than other models focused on a single
type of learning and/or captures fewer behavioral phenomena. Therefore, it is an ideal
candidate for this dissertation and is used to predict and fit data for the MEG, as well as
serve as a synthetic player in the two experiments. However, EWA needed some
modifications to better correspond to the REMEG used here. The EWA and
modifications are described in more detail in the following sections.
The EWA Model
Camerer (2003) identified reinforcement and belief learning as the most
successful approaches for explaining and fitting experimental data. Reinforcement
learning approaches assume that strategies or choices are reinforced by the payoff they
earned and may generalize to similar strategies or choices, but are typically used when
players lack information about payoffs they could have earned (i.e., forgone payoffs;
Camerer, 2003). Belief learning focuses on other players and utilizes their previous
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behavior to form and update beliefs about what they might do in the future (Camerer,
2003). These beliefs are then used to select the best response, assuming the beliefs are
accurate. Belief learning typically does better than reinforcement in coordination games,
while reinforcement does better than belief learning in mixed strategy games. EWA is
essentially a combination of reinforcement and belief learning; however, it demonstrates
general learning characteristics and can be used to model other types of learning by
adjusting its parameters (e.g., direction learning and imitation learning). In addition, the
model includes initial or starting attractions towards choices based on prior experience,
attractions towards choices that are weighted based on recency and level of experience,
and forgone payoffs that could have been earned has a different choice been made.
The EWA model includes elements of reinforcement and belief learning with four
parameters that are meant to correspond to psychological phenomena, such as forgetting
(i.e., rho 𝜌), recency effects (i.e., phi 𝜙), counterfactual thinking (i.e., delta 𝛿), and
individual differences in stimulus discriminability (i.e. lambda 𝜆). The model also has
three unique features: 1) forgone payoffs (payoffs that could have been earned), 2)
growth rate of attractions with separate decay parameters for past attractions and amount
of experience, and 3) initial attractions (starting attraction based on prior experience) with
experience weights (strength). These features are captured by the four EWA parameters
(more specifically, the first three): 1) experience decay (𝜌) controls the strength or impact
of the current level of experience, 𝑁(𝑡), that includes pregame experience, 𝑁(0), and
previous round experience, 𝑁(𝑡 − 1), and is compared to general forgetting, 2) past
attraction decay (𝜙) controls the strength of previous attractions in comparison to the
current one only within the current game and is also compared to forgetting, but has more

12

impact on attractions, 3) the forgone payoff parameter (𝛿) controls the weight of forgone
payoffs (i.e., outcomes) and is considered to represent counterfactual thinking, and 4) the
sensitivity parameter (𝜆) controls the discriminability of or sensitivity to attractions.
Camerer and Ho (1999) consider forgone payoffs (𝛿) to be the crucial element in
EWA as it can direct behavior towards choices with higher forgone payoffs, serve as an
aspiration level or reference for comparison, and capture some biased behavior. This
parameter also controls the learning behavior of the model and changing it can shift the
model more towards reinforcement (when lower) or belief (when higher) learning. The
decay parameters (𝜌 and 𝜙) capture the discounting rate of prior experience and
forgetting. If the discounting rate is high, this would create a strong recency effect, where
previous experience and attractions have less influence on current or future attractions.
Initial or starting attractions are based on prior experience and might reflect strategies
that worked in the past. The interaction between initial attractions and forgone payoffs is
important because it specifies whether more weight is given to prior experience or
learning about the current situation. The sensitivity or discrimination parameter (𝜆) is
considered an individual difference in ability to discriminate between choice attractions,
resulting in increased noise when low as there is lower ability to discriminate between
choice attractions. The EWA model was intended to capture some specific psychological
processes and their interaction during games. Before describing the innerworkings of the
EWA model equations according to my implementation, I will discuss the model’s
behavior and the corresponding psychological processes it is meant to approximate by
explaining how the model would “play” the MEG.
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When humans play the MEG in an experimental setting, they first receive
instructions that includes rules and the payoff matrix. In addition, previous experience
with related coordination scenarios may vary. The information provided by the
instructions and payoff matrix interacts with their previous experience and influences the
attractiveness of the seven possible choices. For the EWA model, I assume a similar
process (See Figure 2).

Figure 2. Brief high-level summary of the EWA model’s behavior in the MEG.
At the start of the MEG, the EWA model has some preexisting experience and
choice attractiveness, which are used to determine the probability weights for all possible
choices. These choice probabilities are influenced by the sensitivity parameter (𝜆) that
makes them easier or harder to discriminate between. When there is higher sensitivity,
the higher choice probabilities are more salient and likely to influence choices. Choices
are then determined by randomly sampling from the set of possible choices using the
14

choice probabilities as weights. There was not a clear way to determine first round
choices for EWA without considering a minimum, so in my implementation I used
human pilot data to set first round choice probabilities. Once a choice is made, a
minimum is determined based on all player choices. The minimum determines the payoff
earned for that round. In addition, EWA considers the forgone payoffs that could have
been earned had a different choice been made and weights then according to the forgone
payoff parameter (𝛿). This could also be interpreted as the degree that counterfactuals are
considered. Once these processes are completed, EWA updates attractions based on last
round experience decayed by 𝜌 (i.e., forgetting), last round attractions decayed by 𝜙 (i.e.,
degree of recency effects), the actual payoff with full weight (i.e., payoffs multiplied by
1), and the forgone payoffs weighted by 𝛿 (i.e., payoffs multiplied by 𝛿). The attraction
updating procedure is meant to capture learning with contiguity throughout the game, so
all previous attractions influence the most current attraction. As mentioned, both decay
parameters affect the strength of deviation from past attractions based on new
experiences. These updated attractions are then used to determine choice probabilities
weighted by 𝜆 for the next round. Next, the model equations are explained in detail.
EWA was designed to study normal form or matrix games, where players have
information about how their behavior and behavior of others affects outcomes. Its
notation is based on this game structure. Games have 𝑛 players and each player is
𝑗

indexed by 𝑖. In general, strategies are written as 𝑠𝑖 , where 𝑗 denotes the specific strategy
out of a set of possible strategies for player 𝑖. Each strategy consists of one or more
choices for a given player, 𝑚𝑖 . The functioning of the EWA model can be described in
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three equations. Here, the equations are discussed in detail based on the approximate
order they calculated; however, this is an oversimplification to explain the model.

Figure 3. Breakdown and interactions between the three main equations in the EWA
model. The bold boxes represent the output value of each equation and the bold arrows
show how these values are fed into the subsequent equation from left to right.
First, the experience equation (first column in Figure 3) represents the amount of
experience, 𝑁, based on observations over time, 𝑁(𝑡). It is calculated at any given time
based on previous experience, 𝑁(𝑡 − 1), and the accumulated experiences during the
game, which are modified based on a depreciation rate parameter (𝜌), 𝜌 ∗ 𝑁(𝑡 − 1).
In the MEG, 𝑁(𝑡) could be considered experience based on rounds played,
depreciated over time based on 𝜌. For example, consider a new MEG is started with one
round played so that 𝑡 = 1 in 𝑁(𝑡). In this case, 𝑁(𝑡 − 1) is equal to the initial or starting
experience, 𝑁(0), based on previous game experience. The current amount of experience
is calculated by multiplying experience decay (𝜌) by the level of experience from the
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previous time period or round (i.e., 𝑁(𝑡 − 1) or 𝑁(0) for the first round), then adding
one round of experience. Equation 1a below shows the experience equation for the first
round, and equation 1b, shows the equation for all subsequent rounds.
𝑁(𝑡) = 𝜌 ∗ 𝑁(0) + 1

(1a)

𝑁(𝑡) = 𝜌 ∗ 𝑁(𝑡 − 1) + 1

(1b)

The choice attraction equation (second column in Figure 3) determines the
𝑗

attraction for each choice. In the MEG, a player, 𝑖, has an attraction, 𝐴𝑖 , for each of the
𝑗

seven choices, 𝑠𝑖 , at any given time, 𝑡. The attraction for a choice at a given point in time
𝑗

is 𝐴𝑖 (𝑡). The attraction for each choice is updated after each round in three steps based
𝑗

on the weighted previous choice attraction, 𝜙 ∗ 𝑁(𝑡 − 1) ∗ 𝐴𝑖 (𝑡 − 1), weighted payoff,
𝑗

𝑗

[𝛿 + (1 − 𝛿) ∗ 𝐼 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)) ] ∗ 𝜋𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖 (𝑡)), and the current amount of experience,
𝑁(𝑡). Equation 2a represents the equation for the first round, and 2b represents the
equation for all other rounds after the first. Similar to pregame experience, 𝑁(0), there is
𝑗

also pregame choice attractions, 𝐴𝑖 (0), that could hypothetically exist from playing the
game in the past.
𝑗

(2a)

𝑗

𝐴𝑖 (𝑡) =

𝑗

𝑁(𝑡)
𝑗

(2b)

𝑗
𝐴𝑖 (𝑡)

=

𝑗

𝜙 ∗ 𝑁(0) ∗ 𝐴𝑖 (0)+[𝛿+(1−𝛿) ∗𝐼(𝑠𝑖 ,𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)) ]∗ 𝜋𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ,𝑠−𝑖 (𝑡))

𝑗

𝑗

𝜙 ∗ 𝑁(𝑡−1) ∗ 𝐴𝑖 (𝑡−1)+[𝛿+(1−𝛿) ∗𝐼(𝑠𝑖 ,𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)) ]∗ 𝜋𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ,𝑠−𝑖 (𝑡))
𝑁(𝑡)
𝑗

The previous choice attraction, 𝐴𝑖 (𝑡 − 1), is weighted by multiplying it with
attraction decay, 𝜙, and previous experience, 𝑁(𝑡 − 1). It is important to note that if
pregame experience, 𝑁(0), was very large, meaning there is a lot of pregame experience
and the decay parameter, 𝜙, was also high, attractions will not change much with
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subsequent experience. This would be like sticking to a previously learned strategy or
preferred choice.
Next, the weighted payoff is calculated by first determining the value of the
𝑗

indicator function, 𝐼 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)). This function is equal to one when updating the choice
𝑗

𝑗

attraction, 𝐴𝑖 , for the choice that was actually made for that round, 𝑠𝑖 (𝑡). The variable 𝑠𝑖
just refers to the choice being updated. The value of the indicator function then
determines the payoff weight, 𝛿 + (1 − 𝛿). When the indicator function is equal to one,

then this payoff weight is also equal to one. However, if the indicator function is equal to
one, then this payoff weight is equal to the value of 𝛿. Next, the payoff weight is
𝑗

multiplied by the payoff, 𝜋𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖 (𝑡)), which is determined by the current choice being
𝑗

updated, 𝑠𝑖 , and the minimum of the current round, 𝑠−𝑖 (𝑡). When the payoff weight is
one because it corresponds to the payoff that was actually earned, then the payoff gets
full weight or is equal to the payoff. In all other cases, the payoff weight is equal to 𝛿 and
the weighted payoff is a forgone payoff (one that could have been earned). This forgone
payoff weight is important for distinguishing between payoffs actually earned and
forgone payoffs. For instance, if 𝛿 is zero, then only actually earned payoffs are
considered, which makes it more similar to strict reinforcement learning. However, if 𝛿 is
one then EWA treats actually earned and forgone payoffs equally, making high payoffs
more salient whether earned or not.
Figure 4 illustrates how attractions change based on different values of 𝛿 when
everything else is held constant. In this example, the actual choice is two, the minimum is
one, and the forgone choice of one is considered. As 𝛿 approaches .8, the attraction for
the forgone choice (i.e., one with payoff 70) is nearly equal to the attraction for the actual
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choice (i.e., two with the payoff of 60). When 𝛿 is higher than .8, the attraction towards
the forgone choice is higher than the actual choice.

Figure 4. Plot showing the attraction value for the choice of 2 (solid line) and attraction
values for the forgone choice of 1 (circles) based on different values of the forgone
payoff parameter 𝛿.
Lastly, the Luce choice rule (Luce, 1959) equation (third column in Figure 3)
determines choice probabilities for the next round based on the current choice attractions
(Equation 3). The next round choice is then determined by randomly sampling a choice
(i.e., 1-7) with the choice probabilities as weights. The exponent in the equation, 𝑒,
represents Euler’s number, which has a value corresponding roughly to 2.72. The 𝜆
parameter serves as a player’s sensitivity to attractions, which could be considered its
degree of salience or the ability to discriminate between attractions.
(3)

𝑗
𝑃𝑖 (𝑡

+ 1) =

𝑒
𝑚

𝑗
𝜆∗𝐴 (𝑡)
𝑖
𝑘 (𝑡)

𝑖 𝑒𝜆∗𝐴𝑖
𝛴𝑘=1

To determine the choice probability for a specific choice, the attraction towards
that choice is multiplied by the sensitivity parameter. Next, a logistic transformation is
performed by calculating Euler’s number to the power of the sum of the choice attraction
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and the sensitivity parameter. Lastly, the choice attraction is normalized by dividing it by
summing all logistically transformed choice probability and sensitivity parameter sums.
This ensures that all seven choice probabilities add up to one.
The four EWA parameters influence which choices the model makes or predicts.
To find appropriate parameter values, Camerer and Ho (1999) estimated EWA
parameters for the median effort game (i.e., median instead of minimum as the order
statistic) and other less related games. The forgone payoff parameter (𝛿) was twice as
large (.85) and initial experience weight (𝑁(0)) was 20 times smaller compared to other
games. These parameter estimations suggested players in the median effort game were
very sensitive to forgone payoffs (larger forgone payoff parameter), learned more during
gameplay (moved further away from initial attractions), and put less value on prior
experience (smaller prior experience weight). The EWA model corresponds to the
structure of the MEG, however, it had to be modified to correspond to the REMEG used
here. The rationale for these modifications is discussed in the following section.
Extended EWA
In the first round of the MEG, EWA calculates choice attractions and with each
new experience, choice attractions are updated (one for each possible choice) based on
actually earned and forgone payoffs. This means that for a given round and minimum,
EWA updates a set of seven choice attractions, one for each of the seven possible
choices. One of these choice attractions is based on the actual payoff earned, which
receives full weight (i.e., 1), while the other six are based on forgone payoffs weighted by
the forgone payoff parameter. This is sufficient when players only have or consider
information about the minimum for each round, but would present a problem if players
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had or considered additional information. In Camerer and Ho (1998), Leng et al. (2018),
and van Huyck et al. (1990) some groups were given the distribution of other player
choices. Although there was less dramatic convergence to one, behavior was not
statistically different from groups only given the minimum. The REMEG used in the
current experiments, gives players choice distributions and counterfactual information
(i.e., what could have been earned with a different choice or minimum). Adding
counterfactuals could increase the saliency of the other possible choices and forgone
payoffs that could result in higher payoffs. In its current form, EWA is not able to utilize
additional outcome information and is not well suited for the REMEG. Therefore, it
requires modification.
A modified version of EWA was developed (Collins, Hough, O’Neil, & Juvina,
2019) to correspond to the REMEG. Specifically, the choice attraction updating
procedure was modified so that each player’s choice is treated as a potential minimum
and a set of choice attractions (i.e., an attraction for each possible choice) is calculated for
each potential minimum (total of four sets of choice attractions). Since this modified
EWA extends the original EWA model to consider each player’s choice rather than just
the minimum, it is referred to as the Extended EWA model (i.e., EEWA) for the
remainder of this paper. The EEWA updating procedure involves updating four choice
attraction sets (i.e., one for each player’s choice treated as the minimum). Since it
considers each player’s choice as a minimum and updates all seven attractions four times
each round, there are a total of 28 choice attraction updates per round. Each choice
attraction set has one payoff that gets full weight and the other six are weighted by the
forgone payoff parameter. Due to the structure of the model and this modified updating
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procedure, the EEWA model treats the actually earned payoff exactly the same as the
fully weighted payoffs based on treating each other player’s choice as a potential
minimum. This is roughly equivalent to the original EWA model playing four separate
rounds with different minimums. However, this modification makes the model more
flexible and sensitive to other player choices, because forgone payoffs are considered for
each player’s choice rather than just for the minimum. Therefore, the model can better
respond based on the behavior of all players in the group. This EEWA model was used in
the first experiment where some insights were learned and some issues were raised
regarding its functioning and limitations.
In addition to coordination behavior identified in the game theory literature and
methods for modeling it, individual differences are also important. The game structure is
the same for everyone, but strategies, perspectives, motivations, and preferences may
differ between individuals. However, the relationship between individual differences and
coordination behavior in the MEG remains unclear. To better understand these
relationships, individual differences were included in the two experiments and are
discussed in more detail in the following section.
Individual Differences in Cognition and Dispositions
There is evidence that players make initial choices based on starting strategies or
preferences (Cooper & van Huyck 2018; Costa-Gomes et al., 2009; van Huyck et al.
1990, 1991), give up on trying to increase coordination efficiency (Brandts et al., 2014,
2015), might be more sensitive to risks (Cachon & Camerer, 1996), and might reciprocate
if they feel cheated by other players (Offerman, 2002). There is some evidence that
coordination efficiency is negatively correlated to risk and positively correlated to trust
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(Bosworth, 2013; Engelmann & Normann, 2010). Relevant effort allocation preferences,
abilities, and dispositions are discussed in the following sections.
Effort-related Traits
Hull (1943) proposed the law of minimum effort, where he suggested that
organisms would take the path of least resistance when left to their own devices. This
notion has been supported (Allport, 1954; McGuire, 1969; Zipf, 1949) and later extended
by showing that animals act based on rewards and costs (Charnov, 1976; Stephens &
Krebs, 1986), such as metabolic cost (Bautista et al. 2001) or number of responses
(Walton et al., 2006). This law has also, not surprisingly, been applied to humans.
Although humans often take “path of least resistance”, they tend to strive for decisionmaking efficiency by considering costs and benefits (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Payne,
Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Simon, 1955). This is not surprising, considering that mental
effort is generally considered to be aversive (Kahneman, 2011; Kurzban, Duckworth,
Kable, & Myers, 2013) and does not always lead to better decisions (e.g., Cosmidies &
Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2006; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). This
literature suggests humans strive for decision-making efficiency; however, some suggest
humans differ in how much effort they are willing to exert (Juvina et al., 2018; Kool et
al., 2010). In addition to the task and environment, Beach and Mitchell (1978) also
pointed out the importance of individual characteristics, such as knowledge base,
opinions, cognitive abilities, motivation, and emotion. Effort preferences and motivation
are traditionally measured using a variety of self-report-based measures that lack
precision. However, Kool et al. (2010) recently created a performance-based measure of
effort preference called the demand selection task (DST). Since effort and motivation
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appear to influence coordination, the DST is used here to explore the potential effects
interaction between effort preferences and coordination behavior.
The DST consists of selecting between two different options presented as disks,
where one option involves more frequent task switching and is more cognitive
demanding than the other option with less task switching. There are several variants, but
only magnitude/parity (Kool et al., 2010) and global/local tasks (Juvina et al., 2018) are
discussed. The magnitude/parity task involves determining if a given number is less than
or greater than five (magnitude) or if it is even or odd (parity). After selecting an option,
a number appears and its color indicates which task to complete. The global/local task
involves a large letter that is made up of small letters; for instance, a large “X” may be
made up of small “X”s or small “T”s. The color of the letters indicates whether to press a
keyboard key corresponding to the big letter or the small letters. For the global/local task,
switching between responding with the small or large letter more often is considered
more cognitively demanding. In both variants, individuals are presented with two disk
options and are encouraged to explore them to determine which one they prefer. The high
demand option has a 90% task switch (i.e., magnitude/parity) or stimulus incongruency
rate (i.e., global/local), while the low demand option has a rate of 10%. In a range of
tasks and demands, Kool et al. (2010) found a higher proportion of participants favored
the low demand option and there were correlations between this “demand avoidance” and
both cognitive control and motivation-related traits. However, there is a potential
confound with these findings; a large portion of participants did not detect the difference
between the two options. To correct for this, Juvina et al. (2018) extended Kool et al.
(2010) by including demand detection point, or point at which the difference between
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options was detected, assuming that detection itself is cognitively demanding. Juvina et
al. (2018) suggested that those who did not detect which option was more cognitively
demanding might be the most demand avoidant. This revised DST is used to measure and
investigate if effort preferences are related to coordination behavior in the MEG, since it
includes two different types of tasks and measurements for demand avoidance.
Juvina et al. (2018) and Kool et al. (2010) both examined relationships between
the DST and other effort-related traits in an effort to help develop a profile for effort
avoidant individuals. Juvina et al. (2018) reported that demand avoidance was negatively
correlated with several effort related-trails, including self-control, need for cognition, and
attentional control. In the MEG, effort avoidant individuals may prefer to stick to low
effort choices to avoid harder arithmetic problems corresponding to higher effort choices.
If so, they would likely be the weak link of the group by setting the minimum at lower
effort and may not respond to other players signaling behavior. Since there are reported
negative correlations with other effort-related traits, it is likely that those with lower
scores for these trait measures may exhibit the same type of behavior. For instance, those
sensitive to risks might start out using a risk dominant strategy and might be hesitant to
choose higher effort due to the risk of receiving a lower payoff if they choose higher than
the minimum. Similarly, those who do not trust others are likely to exhibit similar
behavior, because they might think that other players are in it for themselves. There is
some evidence that players start the game with certain strategies and may deviate from
these strategies over time based on other players choices (Huyck et al. (1990, 1991). If
this behavior is related to effort-related traits, these traits might have more influence at
the beginning of the game, until the behavior of the group overpowers them.
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The preference to avoid effort is also related to the preference for immediate
rewards (Shenhav et al., 2017; Westbrook et al., 2013). This finding is from the
intertemporal choice paradigm where participants are typically asked if they prefer a
certain reward now or if they would prefer to wait and receive a larger reward.
Intertemporal Choice
Those who prefer immediate rewards are thought to discount future rewards
depending on the distance in time, which is often non-linear (Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’Donoghue, 2002). For example, Thaler (1981) asked people how much money they
would require after a specified period of time in order to be seen as equal to receiving
$15 immediately. The amount of money required increased with the amount of delay.
Exactly why this occurs is not completely clear, but it seems to be influenced by several
factors, such as uncertainty, expectations of utility changes, changes in reward value,
emotion or visceral responses (Loewenstein et al., 2002). Weber et al., (2007) suggested
that a main component of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), loss aversion,
might also have a role in intertemporal choice. In this view, people may prefer the
immediate reward, because it represents a sure gain and the delayed reward may be less
preferred because it represents a gamble due to some uncertainty about the future.
Determining the subjective value of a delayed reward seems to require effort and this
could be one reason why delay discounting is related to effort avoidance. Furthermore,
the extent that an individual prefers the immediate reward may be related to self-control
and there is evidence that it is a better predictor of academic achievement than cognitive
ability (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005). In the MEG, this delay discounting could
involve downplaying higher future payoffs (i.e., global efficiency) in favor of lower and
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more immediate payoffs (i.e., local efficiency). For instance, choosing higher effort than
other players in an attempt to influence them to choose higher effort (i.e., signaling) can
lead to higher payoffs in the future if coordination is achieved at higher effort. However,
there is the risk of earning lower payoffs in the short term by choosing higher than other
players. On one hand, a player could signal higher effort and take a short-term loss in
payoffs in order to achieve higher payoffs in the future; given that other players match
that level of effort. On the other hand, a player could discount future payoffs by
perceiving the short-term reduction of payoffs as offsetting the potential benefits of
higher future payoffs and instead decide to maximize payoffs in the short term.
In addition to considering one’s own actions, players are likely to consider what
other players might do. As previously discussed, players can form beliefs and continue to
update them over the course of the game. According to research in metacognition, some
players might be better able to form accurate beliefs about others, which could enable
them to make more appropriate choices.
Metacognition and Beliefs
Individuals differ in their ability to evaluate their own thinking and beliefs, as
well as that of others. Metacognitive ability is relevant to belief formation about oneself
and others, and also involves the calibration (i.e., correspondence) between internal
mental states and reality. The Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) and the Feeling
of Rightness (Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011) were previously used to
tap into metacognitive ability. The Feeling of Rightness appears to trigger some kind of
conflict between one’s internal mental state and the environment, while the Cognitive
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Reflection Test appears to capture this detection and the corresponding ability or
motivation to engage in rethinking to produce a better answer or response to a problem.
In coordination games like the MEG, belief learning is often more effective than
reinforcement learning (Camerer, 2003). However, there is some missing literature
regarding the underlying cognitive mechanisms that influence how individuals form
beliefs about other players and its precision. Literature on metacognition suggests that
people differ in their awareness of their own ability and the ability of others, and this
awareness affects their beliefs and its congruence with reality. Stanovich (2018) believes
detecting inadequacies between a current approach and the environment, and the ability
to shift to an alternative, more appropriate approach are critical aspects of effective
decision making. This metacognitive ability includes both motivation and ability, leading
some to suggest that it is more related to intelligence than traditionally used measures
(Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). There is some empirical evidence to
support this claim as metacognitive ability correlates with cognitive ability and tasks
related to reasoning, analogy, and creativity (Barr, 2015; Toplak et al., 2011).
Sperber et al. (2010) also stresses congruence with between one’s beliefs and
reality by suggesting that in communication, we cannot trust the communications of
others unless we have some degree of vigilance. Following this reasoning, in the MEG,
individuals may have a tradeoff between trust and vigilance. For example, an individual
may trust that others will choose higher effort or continue to do so, and have a degree of
vigilance as they may have been taken advantage of or experienced someone behaving in
their own best interest in the past. Individuals might be more vigilant in the MEG than
they would be in another coordination scenario, as the weak link of the group determines
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payoffs. This might lead towards more distrust at the start of the game resulting in risk or
cost being more salient.
As motivations of other player’s cannot be known, there are likely attempts to
infer motivations and these attempts might be inadvertently biased. For instance, players
could be influenced by something similar to the fundamental attribution error (Ross,
1977). If others choose low effort, they could overestimate the impact of an individual’s
personality traits and underestimate situational factors. In the context of the MEG, this
could result in lower levels of trust or increase the saliency of risk. Individuals may
assume that other players are selfish or are playing to win rather than taking a risk and
trying to coordinate at higher effort. This type of thinking might reduce the likelihood of
players choosing higher than the minimum.
These individual differences in traits and dispositions may be more influential
when there is little or no contextual information, and during the first interactions with
new individuals. In the MEG, certain dispositions could play a role in low first round
choices leading to inefficient coordination at the beginning of the game, which sets a
baseline for the remainder of the game. However, repeated interaction with other players
and interventions may nudge players towards more efficient choices over time.
Interventions for Increasing Coordination Efficiency
Although coordination failure is common (Cooper et al., 1990, 1994, Camerer,
2003, Riechmann & Weimann, 2008; van Huyck et al., 1990), there appears to be greater
difficulty improving efficiency after coordination has stabilized on an inefficient
equilibrium (Brandts & Cooper, 2006; Brandts et al., 2014, 2015; Chaudhuri et al., 2009;
van Huyck et al., 1991). A goal of this dissertation was to identify and gather evidence
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for a parsimonious and low-cost method for encouraging coordination at more efficient
equilibria. Thaler et al. (2013) suggest nudging (i.e., providing indirect guidance) is often
more effective than direct suggestions, which are often perceived as aversive. The
counterfactual manipulation and player signaling behavior can nudge other players and
groups towards more efficient outcomes. The first experiment assesses the influence of
counterfactuals and the second experiment assesses how the direction of counterfactuals
influences coordination efficiency. Both experiments include measures of signaling
behavior. Prior to discussing the experiments, some background literature about
counterfactuals and behavioral signaling are discussed in the following sections.
Counterfactuals
Counterfactual thinking involves considering forgone outcomes (Byrne, 2016;
Kahneman & Miller, 1986), which is more likely after failures or shortcomings
(Gilovich, 1983; Hur, 2001; Roese & Hur, 1997; Roese & Olsen, 1997; Sanna & Turley,
1996; Sanna & Turley-Ames, 2000) and often involve correcting or improving upon
previous behaviors (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1997; Roese et al., 1999). Epstude and
Roese (2008) suggest that this may be dependent on the realization that there is a problem
or goals are not sufficiently met, which is often signaled by negative affect (e.g.,
Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Taylor, 1991; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz &
Clore, 1983). Behaviors to improve future outcomes might be achieved through goaloriented reasoning (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Epstude, 2017) or by increases in
motivation, persistence, and performance (Dyczewski & Markman, 2012; Markman,
McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008). Previous research has investigated the direction and focus
of counterfactuals.
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Direction. Upward counterfactuals are more likely to lead to performance
improvements compared to downward (Morris & Moore, 2000; Nasco & Marsh, 1999).
They involve identifying an alternative action that could have led to a more positive
outcome (Rim & Summerville, 2014; Roese, 1997; White & Lehman, 2005). They can
increase motivation or effort (Markman & McMullen, 2003; Markman et al., 2008),
particularly when improvement is believed to be possible (Dyczewski & Markman,
2012). Typically, upward counterfactuals target things that are easier to change
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986), like one’s own behavior, and appear most helpful for repeat
events with opportunities for change (Smallman & Summerville, 2018). In contrast,
downward counterfactuals can lead to rationalization rather than improvement (Smallman
& Summerville, 2018). They tend to focus on how a situation or outcome could have
been worse (Rim & Summerville, 2014) and are more likely when situations are less
malleable (Dyczewski & Markman, 2012), such as attempting to change another person’s
behavior.
In terms of the MEG, upward counterfactuals (e.g., you could have earned a
higher payoff had you chosen X) are more motivating than downward (e.g., you did well,
you could have earned less), especially when outcomes are malleable. This is the basis of
the information intervention used here and could be a potential method for improving
equilibrium selection and coordination efficiency. Counterfactuals were used as the
information-based intervention because they are general, cost-efficient, and may improve
coordination efficiency in the MEG. In the present experiments, specific counterfactuals
were provided and were expected to nudge individuals towards the forgone choices when
they resulted in better outcomes. However, individuals can freely engage in
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counterfactual thinking and generate these and many other counterfactuals or forgone
outcomes. Although this intervention is designed to assess the effectiveness of explicitly
providing counterfactuals, it also extends to counterfactual thinking. Since counterfactual
thinking is general, it could be applied to other coordination scenarios and may help
increase coordination efficiency. If so, the generality and cost-efficiency of
counterfactual thinking makes it an ideal addition to training for teamwork and
coordination.
Focus. There also appear to be differences in what individuals focus on,
depending on whether one is directly or indirectly involved with a situation (e.g., Girotto
et al., 2007). For instance, when participants read about a person in a situation, they tend
to focus on things that are within the person’s control, such as that person making
different choices (Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991; Mandel & Lehman, 1996; McCloy
& Byrne, 2000; McEleney & Byrne, 2006; Roese & Olson, 1995). However, when
participants experience the situation, they tend to focus on things outside of their control,
such as how other people could have behaved differently or how the situation could have
been different (Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà, & Walsh, 2013; Girotto et al., 2007; Mercier,
Rolison, Stragà, Ferrante, Walsh, & Girotto, 2017; Pighin, Byrne, Ferrante, Gonzalez, &
Girotto, 2011). These findings suggest that counterfactuals may not always serve to
improve future outcomes and can instead be used to understand or rationalize the
behavior after it occurs (e.g., Girotto et al., 2007; Markman, Mizoguchi, & McMullen,
2008; Mercier et al., 2017). This research addressing the focus of counterfactuals has
called some previous findings into question, such as stronger focus on things that easier
to change (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986). If these findings apply to the MEG, it
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suggests that players would focus more on counterfactuals related to other player’s
choices rather than their own. Interestingly, this is congruent with the game structure of
the MEG, as player’s payoffs are determined by the lowest choice in the group. Even if a
player chooses higher effort, the lowest performer determines their payoff.
In addition to the information-based intervention, the other goal was to assess
how repeated interaction with other players can influence behavior. As previously
mentioned, signaling is often discussed as the main method for players to influence
others. It involves choosing higher effort than the minimum, or other players in general,
to encourage other players to choose higher effort, resulting in higher payoffs (i.e.,
greater efficiency) for everyone. Literature provides evidence that players can improve
coordination efficiency of the group, but often involves significant effort, leadership, or
helping behaviors. Here, signaling is explored as a potential method for improving
coordination by nudging other players towards choosing higher effort.
Signaling
Players can send signals to convey information that is not directly observable or is
likely to be overlooked and does not require direct communication. Spence (1978)
described signaling as revealing a player’s “type”, which should have a cost that is offset
by the benefit if the signal receiver uses the information to act accordingly. To be
perceived as credible, a signal should be costly and risky for the sender in terms of effort,
time, or currency. Charness et al. (2018) demonstrated that effort can serve a social
signaling role and effort commitment appears more valuable than money in effort related
tasks. However, they also point out that stated or planned effort may not be predictive of
actual effort. Effort preferences may change over time or in response to reciprocal actions
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and may be short lived. If a person receives a gift, they are more likely to reciprocate for
a period of time (Lowenstein & Schkade, 1999; Lowenstein, 2005) or if they receive
higher payoffs then expected, they might put in more effort for a short period of time
until it returns to a baseline (Gneezy & List, 2006). Interestingly, negative events cause a
stronger change in reciprocal behavior and tend to persist longer (Offerman, 2002).
Costly signaling is a valuable coordination tool, but there is a tradeoff between its
cost and the resulting benefit (Thompson & Kaufman, 2010). Brandts and colleagues
(Brandts et al., 2014, 2015) conducted experiments with the corporate turnaround game,
where a performance trap is set up to create convergence to the lowest effort level, then
the leader is introduced. The leaders brought up the minimum by helping other players.
However, if help was taken away too early (i.e., before players could settle on a new
equilibrium), it was actually worse than no help at all, perhaps due to negative reciprocity
on part of the other players. Leaders stopped helping because it incurred a cost (i.e.,
payoff reduction) that was not sustainable, especially if it failed to bring up the minimum
(i.e., low benefit). These findings are informative for behavior-based signaling in the
MEG. Signaling higher effort should be sustained for a period of time, but to remain
realistic, it should be sensitive to this cost-benefit tradeoff.
The following two experiments utilized both behavioral and model-generated
data. The REMEG, DST, and effort-related traits were used to collect behavioral data and
the EEWA model was used to generate data to explain and fit behavioral data and it
served as a synthetic player. In the first experiment, a new method to improve
coordination efficiency was introduced (i.e., counterfactuals) and newly introduced
methods were used to measure and analyze coordination behavior. Coordination was

34

more efficient compared to previous experiments and there appeared to be little influence
of demand avoidance or effort-related traits beyond the first round of the REMEG in
four-human groups and one-human three-bot groups. In the second experiment with only
one-human three-bot groups, four counterfactual conditions were included (i.e., upward,
bidirectional, downward, and no counterfactuals as a control) to better understand how
counterfactual direction influences coordination efficiency. The upward condition had the
highest efficiency, the downward had the lowest, and there were several differences
between human and bot behavior. After the two experiments, a new model was
developed for the REMEG within the ACT-R cognitive architecture. The cognitive model
included cognitive processes and strategies described in the literature that were missing
from the EWA and EEWA models, and model comparisons revealed it was better able to
fit and explain the human data.
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II.

Experiment 1

The goals of the first experiment were to: 1) measure coordination behavior in the
MEG, and assess its relationship with effort preferences measured by the DST and
individual dispositions, and 2) assess the effectiveness of an information intervention in
the form of counterfactuals. A within subjects’ design was used by measuring both
individual effort (i.e., the DST), and both stated and actual effort (i.e., arithmetic problem
performance) related to coordination (i.e., REMEG) for each participant. The effortful
task in the REMEG (i.e., arithmetic problems) was not designed to be very difficult; it
was designed to be effortful. It involves mental addition (i.e., no paper or calculator) with
single digit numbers ranging from two to eight digits, depending on effort level. Instead
of using errors as a measure of effort, errors were deducted from individual players
payoff and did not affect the group. In addition to actual effort, the REMEG has some
other modifications. In typical MEGs, players receive pregame instructions that cover the
structure of the game and payoffs, are not allowed to communicate, and are given
outcome information about the minimum for each round. Players usually converge to or
towards the least efficient or risk dominant option over time, even when they are given
the distribution of other player choices (Camerer & Ho, 1998; Leng et al., 2018; van
Huyck et al. 1990). In the REMEG, players are given access to a payoff matrix at all
times, the anonymous distribution of player choices, and bidirectional (i.e., upward and
downward) counterfactuals after each round. These modifications helped participants
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understood how to play, could see the variation in player choices, and could potentially
use choices as signals to bring up the minimum.
An additional individual condition was used where one participant plays the
REMEG with three EEWA model-driven bots. This condition was included to evaluate
how similar the EEWA model behavior is to humans, how humans and bots coordinate,
whether the EEWA model is sufficient to simulate human behavior for data collection
purposes. The EEWA model is sensitive to the distribution of payoffs per round and is
more conducive to coordination compared the average human. The initial experience,
𝑁(0), for each bot was set to 0, and the first-round choice was generated based on choice
distributions and variance of the human data in the REMEG. The model does not have
prior knowledge, strategies, or predispositions to behave a certain way beyond stochastic
variation in the first-round choice. The model essentially drifts towards the highest payoff
based on responses of other players. For simplicity, this condition is referred to as the bot
REMEG and the groups with all human players are referred to the human REMEG.
Effort-related traits were included to compare with previous findings with the
DST (Juvina et al., 2018) and explore potential relationships with coordination behavior.
In addition, risk and trust were added based on Devetag and Ortmann’s (2007) literature
review and findings from Bosworth (2013) and Engelmann & Normann (2010)
suggesting that trust encourages more efficient coordination.
Hypotheses
H1: Players will coordinate towards more efficient equilibria compared to
previous MEG experiments due to the counterfactuals presented at the end of each round
and its potential influence on signaling behaviors.
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H2: There are no expected differences in performance on the REMEG or DST
dependent on which task was completed first (task-order conditions).
H3: There is an expected relationship between effort allocation and coordination
efficiency, particularly between effort avoidance (DST) and effort selection (REMEG).
H4: Relationships are expected between effort selections in the REMEG (i.e.,
efficiency) and effort-related traits. Based on previous research, positive relationships
with effort are expected between effort-related traits (Juvina et al., 2018; Kool et al.,
2013) and trust (Bosworth, 2013; Engelmann & Normann, 2010), while a negative
relationship is expected between effort and risk avoidance (Devetag & Ortmann, 2007).
For example, those with higher need for cognition are expected to have higher effort
selections (corresponding to efficiency). In addition, those with higher trust propensity
are expected to choose higher levels of effort and those who are risk avoidant are
expected to choose lower levels of effort.
H5: Coordination is expected to be more efficient in the bot REMEG. The bots
are responsive to effort choices above the minimum, are likely to increase effort in
response to any signaling behavior, and are less likely to be weak link players.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. Data was
collected from a total of 104 participants (approximately 60% female) with a mean age of
23 (SD = 6.8). Participants completed either the human (n = 76) or bot REMEG (n = 28).
All participants were compensated with a base pay of $10 and the opportunity to earn an
additional $10 contingent on performance. Performance was based on the cumulative
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payoff earned during the REMEG with a deduction for each incorrect arithmetic problem.
Participants were informed about this performance pay in the experimental instructions.
Materials
The experiment was completed on a computer and consisted of the DST, the
REMEG, and effort-related trait questionnaires. The DST was programmed and runs in
JAVA, while the REMEG and surveys were programmed and run using the O-tree
platform (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016). The computers were organized in a row of
four cubicles with barriers between each computer booth.
Design
This experiment has a 2 (condition) x 2 (task-order) x 20 (round) mixed design.
Condition was a between subjects’ independent variable, and task-order and round were
within subjects’ independent variables. Effort selections were the main dependent
variable for the REMEG, but exploratory analyses included payoff, and two metrics
derived from effort: distance from the minimum and intergroup variance. There were two
dependent measures for the DST: effort avoidance and demand detection. For the effortrelated traits, the scale scores were the dependent measures.
Participants were pseudo-randomly pre-assigned to the human or bot REMEG
condition. Since four participants were required to run the human REMEG condition,
assignment to the REMEG condition was contingent on how many participants were
available to participate for a given session. Therefore, participants were assigned to the
human REMEG when there were four participants available, otherwise, they were
assigned to the bot REMEG. There was considerable effort allocated towards recruiting
four participants per session, but this was unfortunately dependent on participant
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availability. Participants were randomly assigned to a task order condition (i.e., REMEGDST or DST-REMEG) regardless of REMEG condition (i.e., human or bot).
Procedure
Before starting the experiment, participants read and signed a consent form, and
received instructions. Participants were instructed not to communicate and were told the
DST was an independent task, but the REMEG was a group task that includes all
participants. Since there were not four players present in the bot REMEG, participants
were told three online players would be playing with them. All participants completed the
DST, REMEG, and questionnaires, which took approximately 90 minutes. The order of
the DST and REMEG was counterbalanced to identify and avoid any potential
confounding task order effects. For instance, the subjective cost of effort could increase
over time as suggested by Westbrook and Braver (2014), which could be a confound for
whichever task is completed second.
DST. The DST involves two different variants (Figure 5): the DST-S (task
switching) and the DST-GL (global/local). In the DST-S, participants are presented and
freely choose among two options (i.e., disks with a unique color and design). Once an
option was selected a colored number appeared. If the number was yellow, participants
were instructed to respond with a left mouse click if the number was less than five, or a
right mouse click if greater than five (magnitude task). If the number was green,
participants responded with a left click if the number was odd and a right click if the
number was even (parity). In the DST-GL, Participants are also presented with two disks.
Instead of colored numbers, a large colored letter appeared that was made up of smaller
letters. For example, a large letter “X” could be made up of smaller “X”s or another
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letter. During this task, participants were instructed to report the big letter if it was
presented in yellow, or report the small letter if presented in green.

Figure 5. Stimuli for the DST-S parity task (left), DST-GL congruent trial (middle), and
DST-GL incongruent trial (right).
In both DST variants, there is a low and high demand option. The low demand
option in the DST-S switches between tasks less often (10% compared to 90%), while the
low demand option in the DST-GL has higher global/local (i.e., large/small letters)
congruence (90% compared to 10%). To ensure participants understood each variant,
they were required to pass a tutorial with a 75% accuracy rate in order to move on to the
experimental task. Each variant lasted a total of 10 minutes. Following completion of
each variant, debrief questions were asked and served to indicate whether participants
detected a difference in demand between the options.
REMEG. In the REMEG (O-tree platform; Chen et al., 2016), participants are
given a food catering coordination scenario where each individual has a separate task to
complete, which is part of the overall group goal of completing the job. Each person can
freely choose how productive to be (i.e., effort allocation), but no one can leave until the
job is complete. In the REMEG task, each round begins by choosing how much effort to
allocate towards the group task. This serves as the dependent measure of effort in the
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REMEG and was the dependent measure in previous MEG experiments (Bortolotti et al.,
2016; Leng et al., 2016; van Huyck et al. 1990, 1991). Participants will then be required
to solve an arithmetic problem that corresponds in difficulty (e.g., number of digits to add
together) to the level of effort chosen. To ensure participants are actually attempting to
solve these problems, payoff points were deducted from individuals for each incorrect
answer. After completing the arithmetic problem, they are shown the responses of all
group members, the minimum effort of the group, and their own individual payoff. After
these results are shown, participants were shown bidirectional (i.e., upward and
downward) counterfactuals. As previously mentioned, there was a human REMEG
condition where participants played the game with other people and a bot REMEG
condition where each participant played with bots. The procedure was exactly the same
for both REMEG conditions, except players in the bot REMEG were told the game was
played with three online players.
Effort-related Questionnaires. Participants filled out effort related trait scales,
which included: Need For Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), Tolerance Of Mental
Effort (Dornic, Ekehammar, & Laaksonen, 1991), Preference For And Tolerance Of The
Intensity Of Exercise (Ekkekakis, Hall, & Petruzzello, 2005), Industriousness (Jackson et
al., 2010), the Brief Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). In
addition, risk avoidance (Holt & Laury, 2002) and Trait Trust (Collins, Juvina, & Gluck,
2016) were also measured.
Results
Previous research has not identified appropriate methods to analyze coordination
behavior, therefore, analyses were performed at the round (i.e., average), group, and
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individual levels to thoroughly test the hypotheses and explore new methods of data
analysis. Effort was the main dependent measure, but exploratory analyses were
performed for payoff, and two measures derived from effort: distance from the minimum
and intergroup variance. In addition, a weak link analysis was performed to compare to
Leng et al. (2018). These exploratory analyses served to establish additional methods to
analyze coordination behaviors beyond just average effort and minimum.
The results were separated into three main sections. First, human and bot REMEG
were analyzed separately. The round analysis with effort for the human condition served
as the main analysis to test H1 (more efficient coordination compared to previous studies)
and the round analysis for the bot condition was used as the main analysis to test H5 (bot
condition has greater coordination efficiency than the human condition). Potential task
order effects were explored (REMEG-DST and DST-REMEG) to test H2 (No task-order
effects). The individual analyses were used to assess the relationship between effort
choices and demand avoidance to test H3, and effort-related traits to test H4. Second, all
the data were pooled together and the same analyses were performed. Lastly, the EEWA
model was used to fit data from the human REMEG (REMEG-DST) and was compared
to the original myopic EWA. All data analyses were completed using MatLab version
R2018a, while the EWA model fitting was completed in R studio version 3.4.4.
Human REMEG
In the human REMEG, one group was thrown out because one participant
previously had completed the experiment, resulting in 72 participants (18 groups). There
were 32 participants (8 groups) for REMEG-DST and 40 participants (10 groups) for
DST-REMEG.
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Round Level. To test H1, participant’s effort was averaged across 20 rounds and
compared to van Huyck et al. (1990) and Leng et al. (2018). There were seven groups of
16 in van Huyck et al. (1990) and participants were only given the minimum each round.
There was a significant difference in effort, t(28) = 5.65, p < .0001, d = 2.78, between the
human REMEG (M = 4.34, SD = .29) and van Huyck et al. (1990) (M = 2.78, SD = 1.18).
In Leng et al. (2018), 10 groups of six participants (N = 60) were given complete and
continuous outcome information (i.e., effort, minimum effort, and cumulative payoffs).

Figure 6. Line graphs comparisons showing average effort between the human REMEG,
Leng et al. (2018), and van Huyck et al. (1990) (left) and average effort and variance
between human REMEG order conditions across all 20 rounds (right). Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
Without access to the complete data for Leng et al. (2018), statistical tests were
not possible. However, the average first and last round effort were used to approximate a
trend line for comparison with van Huyck et al (1990) and the REMEG (left in Figure 6).
Coordination in the REMEG was more efficient (higher effort) than in van Huyck et al.
(1990) and Leng et al. (2016) supporting H1.
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To test H2 and assess any potential task order effects, with coordination behavior,
the REMEG data was split by task order (right in Figure 6). There was a significant
difference between the two task orders for effort, t(38) = 7.6, p < .0001, d = 3.19 and
variance, t(38) = -6.8, p < .0001, d = 3.95. For REMEG-DST, effort was higher (M =
4.84, SD = .43) and variance was lower (M = 1.75, SD = .67), compared to DST-REMEG
effort (M = 3.94, SD = .67) and variance (M = 3.14, SD = .62). There appears to be a taskorder effect, where those completing the DST first had lower effort and higher variance
compared to those completing the REMEG first. This task-order effect disconfirms H2.
Group Level. The relationship between coordination and coordination efficiency
was compared for each group. Previously, coordination was measured with the group
minimum (e.g., Leng et al., 2018) or average effort (van Huyck et al., 1990), however,
neither actually measure the extent that players settle on a single choice. For instance, the
minimum only includes the lowest choice in the group and remains constant even if the
majority of the group was choosing higher (i.e., convergence above minimum).
Furthermore, if half of the group chose 6 and the other half chose 2, the average would be
4 and does not reflect the degree of convergence, which is not high in this case. Here,
intergroup variance was used to measure coordination as it better captures the degree of
convergence on a single choice within the group. To compare the relationship between
coordination and coordination efficiency for groups, average effort and variance were
calculated for each group per round and then averaged over all 20 rounds. There was a
non-significant negative trend between average effort and variance, r(16) = -0.38, p =
.12). This negative trend suggests that when players coordinate (i.e., variance is low), it is
likely at more efficient equilibria (i.e., higher effort). On the other hand, when variance is
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high, effort is lower. This could be the result of few weak link players choosing lower
effort than other players or signaling players choosing higher effort in an attempt to
increase efficiency. Next, data were separated by task order. There was a non-significant
negative relationship between average group effort and variance for REMEG-DST, r(6) =
-0.69, p = .057. Interestingly, there was a complete lack of any relationship between
average group effort and variance for DST-REMEG. There was, however, a significant
difference between order conditions for variance (t(16) = -2.1, p = .05, d = .53), where
variance was lower for REMEG-DST (M = 1.75, SD = 1.05), compared to DST-REMEG
variance (M = 3.14, SD = 1.61). These findings suggest that groups coordinated better,
but not necessary more efficiently, when REMEG was first.
Individual Level. Relationships between coordination behavior in the REMEG
with effort avoidance (DST) and effort-related traits were explored. Average player effort
and first round effort served as the measures of coordination behavior in the REMEG.
First round effort was not an explicit part of H3 or H4 and is considered exploratory.
There were no significant relationships between group REMEG and either DST measure
or personality traits, indicating a lack of support for H3 and H4. Next, data were split by
task order. For REMEG-DST, there was a significant relationship between first round
effort and demand avoidance (r(30) = -.45, p = .01). However, the relationship with
demand avoidance only held for the first round and was not significant for average effort
across 20 rounds. There were no significant or notable relationships found in DSTREMEG. They were included as previous literature suggested players start the game with
preferences and deviate from them over time based on experience (e.g., Camerer & Ho,
1998; Huyck et al., 1990, 1991). The relationship between demand avoidance and first

46

round effort for REMEG-DST, and the task-order effect suggests previous mental effort
during the DST likely reduced effort allocation and reduced coordination efficiency.
Next, a novel measure called the distance from the minimum was used for
exploratory analyses. It was calculated for each participant by taking the difference
between effort and the minimum for each round and then averaging across rounds. This
measure of coordination provided a more appropriate comparison, since each player was
nested within a four-person group with its own dynamics and it relates to signaling
behavior (i.e., choosing higher than the minimum). The mean difference from the
minimum was positively related to first round effort (r(70) = .25 , p = .036), indicating
that those who chose higher effort in the first round tended to do so for the remainder of
the game. Data was split by task order and explored. Mean distance from the minimum
was lower for REMEG-DST (M = .98, SD = .55), compared to DST-REMEG (M = 1.39,
SD = 1.09), and this difference was significant, t(96) = -2.34 , p = .02, d = .47. In
addition, there was an unexpected finding with task order: relationships with mean
distance from the minimum were in opposite directions (Figure 7). REMEG-DST average
distance from the minimum had non-significant negative relationships with both first
round effort and average effort, and had a significant negative relationship with average
group effort (r(30) = -.56, p < .001). DST-REMEG average distance from the minimum
is positively and significantly related to both first round (r(38) = .51, p = .001) and
average effort (r(38) = .76, p < .0001), but not average group effort. This finding is
interesting because players in DST-REMEG are not coordinating well and appear to be
choosing higher than the minimum, perhaps due to some players signaling in an effort to
nudge other players to choose higher effort.
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Figure 7. Scatterplots showing the relationship between mean distance from the
minimum and average group effort for REMEG-DST (left) and DST-REMEG (right).
An exploratory weak link player analysis was performed to compare to Bortolotti
et al. (2016). All players were ranked according to their mean distance from the minimum
(i.e., players with the lowest ranking). Although this pattern was consistent, there were a
few rounds where the minimum was not set by the weak link (left in Figure 8). To justify
splitting data by ranks, a one-way ANOVA was performed. The ANOVA was
significant, F(3,76) = 58.91, p < .0001, d = .42 and all groups were statistically different
from each other. This result also suggests differences in signaling behavior, as stronger
links are more likely to be signaling and weak links are not.
Average effort for weak links was higher for REMEG-DST (M = 4.43, SD = 0.65)
than DST-REMEG (M = 2.95, SD = 0.46) and this difference was significantly different
(t(38) = 8.33, p < .0001, d = 5.28). However, there were no differences between task
orders for any other rank group. Next, the 18 weak links were separated for analysis.
First round effort had a significant positive relationship with average effort (r(16) = .48, p
= .04). The relationship between first round effort and average effort was not significant
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for REMEG-DST, but was for DST-REMEG (r(8) = .73, p = .016). Weak link effort
declined slightly over time and weak links appeared to be influenced by task order.

Figure 8. Line plots showing average effort per mean distance from the minimum rank
groups (left) and between task orders for the weakest links (right) over all 20 rounds for
the human REMEG. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Bot REMEG
There were 28 groups (one for each participant) in the bot REMEG. There were
14 participants for REMEG-DST and 13 participants for DST-REMEG. The data were
analyzed using the same methodology as the human REMEG.
Round Level. Participant’s effort and variance were averaged for each of the 20
rounds and were compared to the human REMEG (left in Figure 9) to test H5. There was
a significant difference for variance (t(38) = -10.9, p < .0001, d = 7.85), but not for effort.
The bot REMEG had lower variance (M = .94, SD = .53) compared to variance in the
human REMEG (M = 2.52, SD = .36). These results did not support H5. Players
coordinated (lower variance) significantly better in the bot MEG, but according to the ttest, efficiency (average effort) was not significantly better.
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Figure 9. Line graphs showing average effort and variance comparisons between human
and bot REMEGs (left) and between bot REMEG task orders across all 20 rounds (right).
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Next, data was split by task order, and average effort and variance were compared
across all 20 rounds (right in Figure 9) to further test H2. The difference between effort
was significant (t(38) = 5.9, p < .0001, d = 3.85), but the difference between variance was
not. For REMEG-DST, average effort was higher (M = 4.62, SD = .24) compared to
DST-REMEG effort (M = 4.27, SD = .12). Similar to the human REMEG, coordination
appeared to be at less efficient equilibria when the DST was completed prior to the
REMEG. However, in the bot REMEG, there was no difference in variance.
Group Level. There was a non-significant negative relationship between average
group effort and variance, however, variance is very low in the bot REMEG regardless of
average effort. Next, data were separated by task order, which reduced the sample size to
15 groups for REMEG-DST and 13 for DST-REMEG. There were non-significant,
negative relationships between average group effort and variance for REMEG-DST,
r(13) = -.40, p = .15, and DST-REMEG, r(11) = .16, p = .61. However, the relationship is
much weaker for DST-REMEG.
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Individual Level. The relationship with demand avoidance in the DST tested H3
and the relationship with effort-related traits tested H4. This analysis included only 26
participants, because two participants did not complete the DST and were excluded.
There were a few notable relationships between the bot REMEG and the DST, but not
with personality traits. Demand avoidance had a negative non-significant relationship
with average effort and group variance. However, demand avoidance did have significant
negative relationships (Figure 10) with both average payoff (r(24) = -.41 , p = .04) and
group effort (r(24) = -.39 , p = .05). These findings did not support H3, but provided
weak evidence for a relationship between demand avoidance and coordination behavior.

Figure 10. Scatterplot showing the relationship between average group effort and demand
avoidance for bot REMEG.
Although there were significant correlations between demand avoidance, average
payoff, and average group effort, there were no significant correlations for task-order
conditions. However, relationships were trending in the same direction and magnitude.
Pooled Data
All data was pooled together to explore the round, group, and individual levels
using the same procedure as above. This was appropriate because the design was the
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same for both human and bot REMEG. Pooling the data also reduces the noise or random
variation and gives a better idea of the overall behavioral trends in the REMEG.
Round. Significant differences were found between task orders for both effort
(t(38) = 9.56, p < .0001, d = 6.28) and variance (t(38) = -6.4, p < .0001, d = 4.7) (Figure
11). For REMEG-DST task order, effort was higher (M = 4.7, SD = .24) and variance was
lower (M = 1.14, SD = .47), compared to DST-REMEG effort (M = 4.13, SD = .12) and
variance (M = 1.98, SD = .35). This provided more evidence for task-order effects.

Figure 11. Line graphs showing average effort and variance across all 20 rounds for the
pooled data (left) and pooled data split by task order (right). Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
Group. There was a significant negative relationship between average group
effort and variance (r(41) = -.31, p = .001), which indicates that when players
coordinated (i.e., lower variance) it was at higher effort (left in Figure 12). The higher
variance when effort was low could be a result of weak link players or signaling players
attempting to bring up the effort selections of the group. This finding relates to H1.
Next, data were split by order condition and the same procedure was used to
compare effort and variance (right in Figure 12) for task orders. Interestingly, there was a
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significant negative relationship between average group effort and variance for REMEGDST (r(20) = -.44, p = .002), but not for DST-REMEG (r(20) = -.07, p = .61).

Figure 12. Scatterplots showing the relationship with average group effort and variance
for the pooled REMEG data (left) and the pooled REMEG data for REMEG-DST (right).
Individual. The pooled data were analyzed at the individual level to explore
relationships between the REMEG, DST, and personality traits. Analyses of personality
traits revealed two significant negative relationships. Self-control was negatively
correlated with average effort (r(95) = -.21, p = .04) and need for cognition was
negatively correlated with first round effort (r(95) = -.21, p = .04). These relationships
are in the opposite direction as expected, based on previous research (e.g., Kool et al.,
2013; Juvina et al., 2018). This provides weak support for H4. There were no significant
relationships for task orders separately.
Demand avoidance had non-significant, negative relationships with first round
effort and average effort. The negative relationship with demand avoidance and average
effort was not significant for either order condition.
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Figure 13. Scatterplots showing the relationship between first round effort and demand
avoidance for REMEG-DST (left) and DST-REMEG (right).
However, the relationship between first round effort and demand avoidance was
more interesting (Figure 13). For REMEG-DST (left), there was a significant negative
relationship (r(44) = -.31, p = .04), but for DST-REMEG (right) this relationship
disappeared (r(49) = .18, p = .21).

Figure 14. Bar graphs showing mean demand avoidance scores for task orders.
Since several significant differences were found between REMEG and task
orders, demand avoidance data were explored for these potential differences as well.
There was no difference in demand avoidance between the human REMEG and bot
REMEG. However, there was a significant difference between task orders for the pooled
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data, (t(95) = -2.69, p = .008, d = 2.18). REMEG-DST had lower demand avoidance (M =
.59, SD = .42) compared to DST-REMEG (M = .79, SD = .34) (see Figure 14). This is
interesting and contrasts with the task-order effect that suggested increased subjective
cost of effort. Perhaps there is a transfer effect from the first to second task.
EEWA Model Fit
The EEWA model (Collins et al., 2019) used in the bot REMEG was also used to
fit the human REMEG data to provide additional data to explore why players may have
coordinated at efficient equilibria. In order to fit the data, the four free parameters for the
EEWA were estimated using a hill-descending algorithm that iteratively found goodfitting regions within the 4-dimensional parameter space
(github.com/koneill1994/MEG_EWA_model/blob/master/HillClimber.R). Means and
standard deviations were estimated for the forgone payoff weight, 𝛿 (M = .2, SD = .0),
depreciation rate of experience, 𝜌 (M = .9, SD = .001), decay rate for previous attractions,
Φ (M = .21, SD = .17), and sensitivity to attractions, 𝜆 (M = .49, SD = .09). The mean

parameter estimations correspond with previous literature; however, the forgone payoff
weight is significantly lower than Camerer and Ho’s (1998) estimation for the median
effort game. Based on the nature of the EEWA model, this is not surprising. Out of the 28
attraction updates per round, four attractions correspond to the actual choice and involve
payoffs that are given full weight. This means that the actual payoff and three forgone
payoffs receive full weights and are all treated like actual payoffs. Therefore, the forgone
payoff parameter in the EEWA has a less dramatic effect on attractions values compared
to the original EWA.
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To produce model fits, EEWA models were used to simulate 100 four-person
groups during the REMEG. The average effort and the average minimum for both EWA
(Camerer & Ho, 1999) and EEWA model simulations are shown in Figure 15 along the
human data for all 20 rounds. As expected, the EEWA fit the human REMEG data better
for average effort (r = .55, RMSE = .31) and minimum (r = .5 , RMSE = .48), compared
to EWA fits for average effort (r = .52, RMSE = .96) and minimum (r = .47, RMSE =
1.02). However, the EEWA model was not penalized for extra complexity (i.e.,
considering each player’s choice as a potential minimum). Similar to the human data, the
EEWA model had relatively stable average effort, compared to the gradual decline in
effort for the EWA across the 20 rounds.

Figure 15. Line graphs comparing EWA model fits to the average effort (left) and
minimum (right) for the human REMEG. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Next, average group effort and variance for the EEWA model simulations were
plotted and compared to the human REMEG data (Figure 16). There was a negative
relationship between average group effort and variance for the human REMEG (r(16) = .38, p = .12). There was also a negative relationship between average group effort and
variance for model simulation groups (r(98) = -.25, p = .01).
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Figure 16. Scatterplot showing the relationship between average group effort and
variance for the human groups and EEWA model groups in the REMEG.
Based on the findings from the human data, the EWA (e.g., only the minimum for
each round is used to update attractions), and EEWA (e.g., each player’s choice is used as
a potential minimum and attractions are updated four times per round), players may have
coordinated at more efficient equilibria by utilizing counterfactual information and
engaging in costly signaling.
Discussion
Overall, there was support for H1, however, the reason(s) were unclear. Players
coordinated on more efficient equilibria or at higher effort compared to van Huyck et al.
(1990) and on average effort remained rather flat across 20 rounds. There was a negative
relationship between effort and variance per group in the human, bot, and pooled
REMEG data. There are three potential reasons for this increased efficiency: providing a
complete player choice distribution, addition of counterfactuals, and small group size.
Some previous work demonstrated that introducing player choice distributions has little
effect on coordination (Camerer & Ho, 1998; van Huyck et al., 1990). In addition, Leng
et al. (2018) found higher effort than van Huyck et al. (1990) with six person groups,

57

however, even with complete information players still showed a general trend towards
lower effort over 10 rounds of play. Based on previous research where additional
information did not improve efficiency (Camerer & Ho, 1998; Leng et al., 2018; van
Huyck et al. 1990) and findings here, it is assumed counterfactuals were responsible for
the higher coordination efficiency. In addition, there was some evidence that players were
signaling based on the distance from the minimum analyses and relationship between
group effort and variance.
The presence of the task-order effect disconfirmed H2 and suggested that
completing the DST first had an effect on coordination and coordination efficiency in the
REMEG. Specifically, effort selections in REMEG were lower (i.e., lower efficiency)
and variance was higher (i.e., lower degree of coordination) for those completing the
DST first (DST-REMEG). This finding relates to H3 and is discussed further.
Support for H3 was less straightforward. There was some direct support for H3 in
the individual level analyses for the bot and pooled REMEG data, and indirect support
from the task-order effect. The task-order effect where those completing the DST first
performed worse in the REMEG corresponds with previous research (e.g., Kool &
Botvinick, 2014) by suggesting the DST may increase the subjective cost of effort and
promote effort avoidance. For instance, higher subjective cost of effort may have reduced
effort allocated towards math problems or reasoning about strategies during the REMEG.
Players may have paid less attention to player choice distributions and counterfactuals,
preferred easier math problems, or wanted to make simple choices without much thought.
Completing the DST first appeared to influence effort avoidance-like behavior or the
subjective cost of effort in the REMEG, which reduced coordination and coordination
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efficiency. This conflicts with Rand and colleges’ (Rand et al., 2014; Rand, Greene, &
Nowak, 2012; Rand, Newman, & Wurzbacher, 2015;) idea that cooperation is less
effortful than self-interest and is the default strategy. For example, in the MEG, players
could cooperate by decreasing the discrepancy between their choice and choices of other
players. Interestingly, there was a task order effect found for the DST in the opposite
direction. For instance, effort selections were lower in the REMEG when the DST was
completed first, but demand avoidance was lower when the REMEG was completed first.
This suggests a possible transfer effect between tasks dependent on the task completed
first. Interestingly, the task-order effect appeared to be stronger for weak links,
suggesting an increased potential for weak links to bring down the performance of the
group after a cognitively demanding task.
For H4, there was very little support. There were only three significant
relationships exclusively in the pooled data. BSC was negatively related to both average
effort and average group effort, while NFC was negatively related to first round effort.
These results suggest self-control might help in wasting less effort during the game and
those high in NFC might waste less effort at the very start of the game. These findings
conflict with previous experiments with effort-related personality traits and demand
avoidance, which suggest these relationships should be positive (e.g., Kool et al., 2013;
Juvina et al., 2018). In addition, Devetag and Ortmann (2007) suggested risk and trust are
related to coordination, and Bosworth (2013) and Engelmann & Normann (2010) found
evidence that trust may encourage efficient coordination, while and risk may decrease
efficiency. However, the current study failed to support these findings as risk avoidance
and trust were not related to effort selections.

59

There was no evidence to support H5, as players in the bot REMEG did not
coordinate on more efficient equilibria than the human REMEG. It is possible that the
higher variance in the human REMEG was positive as it was higher at lower effort,
which may have helped prevent coordination at lower levels of effort. Higher variance
could result from one or two players signaling higher effort, or one weak link choosing
lower effort than the other players. That being said, the average effort in the human
REMEG is impressive given the increased probability for weak link players.
The EEWA model fit to the human data and comparison with the EWA model
provides further support for the additional outcome information, particularly the
counterfactuals, driving the increased efficiency observed here.
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III.

Experiment 2

In typical MEG experiments, players converge towards the most inefficient or
lowest payoff option (e.g., van Huyck et al., 1990) and once this occurs it is difficult to
improve in subsequent rounds (Brandts & Cooper, 2006; Brandts et al.,2014, 2015;
Chaudhuri et al., 2009). However, in the first experiment, coordination was more
efficient and stable across 20 rounds compared to previously reported experiments (e.g.,
Camerer & Ho, 1999; Leng et al., 2018; van Huyck et al., 1990). In addition, the analysis
of average effort and variance per group revealed a significant negative relationship in
the pooled REMEG data. These results suggested that when players coordinated, it was
more likely at higher effort. Any increase in variance could be a result of a weak link
player(s) avoiding higher effort or a potential “strong link” player(s) choosing higher
effort in an attempt to signal others. These results were promising regarding increasing
efficiency, but there were some unanswered questions.
It is not clear why efficiency was higher and remained stable over the course of
the REMEG. Behavior could have been influenced by the real effort task, however, this
experiment and a previous study (Bortolotti, et al. 2016) addressed the potential influence
of effort. Although Bortolotti et al. (2016) found coordination at higher levels compared
to previous experiments, they used smaller groups, had access to more information, and
had several opportunities to size up other players (e.g., costly signaling). There is
inconclusive evidence that their effortful task encouraged higher effort selections that
increased efficiency. In addition, the first experiment suggests that exerting mental effort
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prior to coordination (e.g., completing the DST prior to the MEG) has a negative
effect on efficiency. Another possible explanation is that additional outcome information
(i.e., distribution of all choices and counterfactuals) improved efficiency. However,
previous studies found player choice distributions (e.g., Camerer & Ho, 1999; van Huyck
et al. 1990) and even cumulative information during the game (e.g., Leng et al. 2018) had
little effect on efficiency. Previous research, results of the first experiment, and the
EEWA model fits suggest that the more efficient coordination observed here was related
to counterfactuals. However, there is currently no direct evidence to support this
conclusion and group size effects cannot be completely ruled out. In addition, there was
some evidence that players were signaling and this was related to both coordination and
coordination efficiency. A follow up experiment was necessary to investigate the extent
that counterfactuals improved efficiency and further assess the role of signaling behavior.
The second experiment extended the counterfactuals from the first experiment by
assessing the effectiveness of four counterfactual conditions: upward (i.e., “you could
have earned a higher payoff if you had chosen X or if the minimum was X”), downward
(i.e., “you could have earned a lower payoff if…”), bidirectional (included both upward
and downward counterfactuals), and no counterfactuals (control condition). The first
experiment only used bidirectional counterfactuals, however, as mentioned, previous
literature suggests there are distinct differences between upward and downward
counterfactuals. Upward counterfactuals are more likely to increase motivation or effort
(Markman & McMullen, 2003; Markman et al., 2008) and improve future performance
(Morris & Moore, 2000; Nasco & Marsh, 1999). Downward counterfactuals may lead to
rationalization rather than improvement of future performance (Smallman &
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Summerville, 2018). Based on previous literature, the upward counterfactuals should be
more likely to influence individuals to choose higher effort than downward. In the second
experiment, differences between the control condition and counterfactual conditions
would suggest that counterfactuals can influence coordination. Differences between
counterfactual conditions would further suggest that counterfactuals influence
coordination in different directions depending on the counterfactuals. Lastly, if
participants in the upward counterfactual condition perform better than those in the other
conditions, it would support the hypothesis that counterfactuals can increase coordination
efficiency. Furthermore, the exploratory analyses in the first experiment provided some
evidence that signaling can be measured using distance from the minimum.
The second experiment was designed to run on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Mturk)
after the difficulty with running four-person groups in person. However, after two weeks
of testing, it became evident that running a large number of four-person groups was also
not feasible using Mturk. Therefore, the second experiment was re-designed to run single
participants that play with three EEWA bots. The EEWA model needed some updates to
address concerns raised after the first experiment. These updates are discussed in detail in
the next section.
Updated EEWA Model
As previously discussed, the EEWA calculates four “earned” payoffs based on its
choice and they are treated equally (i.e., same weight). The earned payoff is based on the
real minimum and the three other “earned” payoffs are based on other players choices
treated as potential minimums. This issue was addressed. The updated EEWA model
gives full weight to the actual payoff (i.e., actual choice and minimum) and the three
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forgone payoffs based on potential minimums (other player choices) are weighted by
delta (i.e., forgone payoff parameter). In addition, the model was updating choice
attractions sequentially in a random order and treated each update like a separate round
that was subject to memory decay. This updating procedure was revised so that all sets of
attractions are calculated separately then averaged for each choice so that all sets of
attractions are treated equally for a given round.
As the second experiment includes additional counterfactual conditions, condition
specific EEWA models were developed. For example, in the upward counterfactual
condition, participants are given counterfactuals for choices and minimums one and two
higher than their actual choice and the group minimum. As the EEWA model considers
all possible choices for the minimum, the upward EEWA model only needs to include
two additional choice attraction sets for counterfactual minimums. This minor change
makes the condition specific EEWA models more closely correspond to the different
counterfactual conditions. Two generations of condition specific variants were developed
and compared to evaluate which method was most appropriate for serving as a synthetic
player. These condition specific variants are labeled with “C” for condition and the letter
that corresponds to the specific condition (e.g., EEWA-UC for the upward condition).
Since the control condition has no counterfactuals, the EWA model was used since it is
more congruent with that condition.
First Generation EEWA-C
The first generation of condition specific EEWA variants have two additional
attraction sets based on the two counterfactual minimums. For example, the firstgeneration upward condition model (i.e., EEWA-UC1) generates four sets of attractions
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(i.e., one for each player’s choice) where only the real payoff gets full weight (i.e., based
on the player’s choice and the real minimum), and two additional sets of choice
attractions for one and two higher than the real minimum. A major limitation with these
models is the lack of data for validating the effects of counterfactuals. Previous
experiments have used minimum effort games, but did not include counterfactual
conditions. Therefore, the EEWA-C models are based on assumptions about human
behavior in these conditions based on two separate lines of previous work with the
minimum effort game and with counterfactuals. These underlying assumptions of the
model are important and should be better informed. The goal of this dissertation is to see
how the counterfactual conditions and signaling can influence coordination behavior. Illinformed model-based bots could potentially have a stronger influence on the human
player’s behavior than the counterfactuals, which would defeat the purpose of the
experiment. The solution to this problem is to use bots that are heavily influenced by the
human player’s choices rather than the counterfactuals. If the human player is influenced
by the counterfactuals, then this should influence the bots as well. Therefore, before
making assumptions about the influence of the counterfactuals, it was important to
evaluate how they influenced human players during the REMEG. Since the bot EEWA
model previously used in the first study bot REMEG condition was very sensitive to
other players choices, it served as the base for the second-generation models. This bot
EEWA model is quite different as it was intended to be conducive to coordination rather
than be psychologically plausible, and has two potential issues.
First, the bot EEWA generates a set of attractions for all player’s choices and it
does not distinguish between the real minimum and potential minimums. However, this
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concern was already raised and addressed. Second, delta (i.e., the forgone payoff
parameter) was set to 1, which means that all payoffs have full weight. Normally, only
the actual payoff earned (i.e., based on the player’s real choice and real minimum for that
round) gets full weight and everything else is weighted by delta. If delta is set to 1, then
every choice attraction in every set gets full weight. Together, these two issues mean that
the bot EEWA considers every possible choice for every possible minimum and treats
them all equally regardless of what choice was made and what the minimum was for each
round. To assess the bot EEWA and its response to signaling, three simulations were run
with four bot EEWA bots (Figure 17). One simulation had no signaling (black), a second
had one bots choice fixed at 7 (blue), and a third had one bots choice fixed at 1 with a
shift to 7 at round 11 (red). The signaling bot has a strong influence on the mean, so the
signaling bot was removed from the figure to show its effects on the other bots.

Figure 17. Average effort for three simulation runs (no signaling, signaling at 7, and
signaling at 1 and 7) with the three non-signaling bot EEWA bots across all 20 rounds.
As shown in Figure 17, the bot EEWA is much more sensitive to other player
choices and is a better candidate to serve as a bot for the first proposed experiment. It
does not make strong assumptions about the influence of counterfactuals and allows the
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one human player to have a strong influence on the group since the bot EEWA is
sensitive to signaling behavior.
Second Generation EEWA-C
The second generation EEWA-C models are based on the bot EEWA and have
mild influence from the counterfactuals per condition. All EEWA-C models generate four
sets of choice attractions based on all player choices, but generate up to two unique
choice attraction sets specific to the counterfactual condition. For instance, if all players
chose an effort level of 3 in the upward condition, the EEWA-UC model would generate
four sets of choice attractions that all consider 3 as the minimum. These are referred to as
the potential minimums. Since the real minimum is 3, the EEWA-UC model would also
generate two additional choice attraction sets for the minimums of 4 and 5, since upward
counterfactuals show forgone payoffs for one and two higher than the minimum. These
minimums are referred to as counterfactual minimums and the choice attraction sets for
them are weighted less than potential minimums. This feature allows some influence
from the counterfactuals, but makes the model more sensitive to player choices than the
counterfactuals. Although this version is better suited to investigate how counterfactuals
influence human coordination, it still imposes assumptions about the influence from
counterfactuals. A solution to this problem is to use three bots that are not influenced by
counterfactuals, but are sensitive to other players choices. Therefore, any difference
between counterfactual conditions could then be attributed to the human’s behavior and
any effects from the counterfactuals. Figure 18 shows the results of simulations using this
set up. To test the reactivity to signaling-like behavior, the choices of one bot were
manipulated in the same manner as the bot EEWA in Figure 16 above.
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Figure 18. Average effort for all conditions with no signalers, one signaler always
choosing 7, and one signaler choosing 1 for the first 11 rounds then switching to 7 for the
remaining rounds. Note: the signaling bot was removed.
Since the bots are meant to approximate human behavior, they need to have some
variability that approximates individual differences. Also, as previously mentioned, there
are problems with setting delta or forgone payoff weights to one. To address both
concerns, each bot had a unique delta that was sampled from a truncated normal
distribution with a mean of .9, standard deviation of .1, and an upper limit of 1. This
allowed for the actually earned payoff to receive full weight and all other payoffs are
weighted by delta. This unique delta corresponds to individual differences where some
bots place more weight on the choice actually made and others may place equal weight
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on both actual and forgone choices. Another issue is that humans come into situations
with previous experience. To approximate this, the human data for first round choices
were pooled and used to generate first round choice probabilities for the bots and
pregame experience was set at 20 (i.e., 20 previous instances of coordination). To allow
for variability, the bots randomly sample a choice for the first round from a choice
distribution weighted by the human first round choice probabilities. In addition, the bots
start the game with choice attractions that correspond to these first-round choice
probabilities. The settings for pregame attractions and experience mean that bots start the
game with choice attractions, and they get larger as the game progresses.
Prior to running the experiment, pilot data was collected for 10 participants. The
results of the pilot run prompted one minor change to the EEWA model. Compared to
four-human groups, the three EEWA bots and human tended to reach equilibrium faster
than four-person human groups and had more resistance getting pulled out of equilibrium
by signaling behavior. To increase congruence with four-person groups, a slight change
was made to the attraction decay parameter (𝜙). It was changed from .7 to .6, which
resulted in a slight reduction in the speed of equilibrium and slight increase in reactivity
to signaling after equilibrium is reached without sacrificing other qualities of the model.
For consistency and reduction of unintended effects on the human, the same EEWA bots
were used in the control condition. This also allowed for a more appropriate comparison
across all conditions.
The second experiment used the same general design as the first experiment,
specifically, the REMEG with four-human players (i.e., human REMEG). However, the
second experiment had five modifications. First, the DST was removed. The findings
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from the first experiment were interesting, but were sufficient to explore the potential
influence of effort avoidance. Second, since there were no findings with trait measures,
the trait measures were reduced to trait trust and industriousness. Third, to compare with
the first experiment and to investigate differences between counterfactual conditions,
there were upward, bidirectional, downward, and control counterfactual conditions. Each
condition utilized a completely randomized between subjects’ design with effort selection
as the dependent variable and counterfactual condition as the independent variable with
four levels (upward, bidirectional, downward, and no counterfactuals as a control).
Fourth, to assess whether participants paid attention to instructions and the counterfactual
manipulation, an instruction quiz and manipulation check were added. Fifth, due to data
collection issues with four-person groups, whether physically present or participating on
Mturk, the REMEG was revised so that single human participants played the REMEG
with three condition specific EEWA bots. This change is rather significant regarding the
interpretation of the results and certainly reduces the generalizability to coordination with
all human groups. Therefore, the hypotheses are placed within the context of one human
playing with three EEWA bots that did not receive the experimental manipulation of
counterfactuals. The goal of the second experiment was to investigate if and how
counterfactuals influence coordination efficiency (i.e., where players land on the payoff
continuum from lowest to highest) compared to past MEG experiments.
Hypotheses
There are three specific, theory driven, a priori predictions about the difference
between counterfactual conditions in the context of one human interacting with three bots
that lack the experimental manipulation. Since this experiment is focused on investigating
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the influence of counterfactuals on effort selections and coordination efficiency, the bots
in each condition are the same besides controlled variation in forgone payoff weights that
correspond to individual differences. This standardization of bot behavior allows for
more clear-cut comparisons between conditions, because any differences in behavior can
be attributed mainly to the human and the experimental manipulation.
H1: Counterfactuals (i.e., upward, bidirectional, and downward) are expected to
influence coordination efficiency (i.e., Average effort) in the REMEG.
H2: Efficiency was expected to be higher for the upward counterfactual condition
compared to downward and control conditions.
H3: Efficiency was expected to be higher for the downward condition compared
to the control.
These hypotheses were extended by running 100 game simulations for each
counterfactual condition (Figure 19). Each group was comprised of three EEWA bots and
one EEWA-C bot that served as the human player. To correspond to the second
experiment, the three EEWA bots only received player choices (i.e., no counterfactuals)
and the EEWA-C bot received condition specific counterfactuals. The EEWA-C bots
gave half weight to the forgone payoffs based on the condition specific counterfactuals.
An ANOVA was performed for average effort, revealing a significant difference between
conditions, F(3,76) = 13.9, p < .001, and post hoc comparisons revealed that all pairs
were significantly different (p < .05) except for upward and bidirectional, and downward
and control pairs. The simulations predicted support for hypothesis 1 and 2, but not for 3
since downward and control conditions were not statistically different. According to these
simulations, the control condition is predicted to perform better than hypothesized.
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Figure 19. Average effort (left) and average effort per round (right) for all experimental
conditions. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Method
The REMEG and trait questionnaire set up was nearly identical to the first
experiment, except for the changes outlined above: 1) the DST was removed, 2) trait
measures were reduced to trait trust and industriousness, 3) there were upward,
bidirectional, downward, and control counterfactual conditions, 4) an instruction quiz and
manipulation check were added, and 5) one human participant played the REMEG with
three condition specific EEWA bots. The whole experiment, including the REMEG and
trait questionnaires, lasted approximately 25 minutes.
Participants
A total of 260 completed the experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Participants were randomly assigned to the control (n = 63), upward (n = 66), downward
(n = 68), or bidirectional (n = 63) condition. The majority of participants were male
(about 65%) and the average age was 35. All participants were compensated with a base
pay of $3 and the opportunity to earn an additional $2 bonus contingent on performance
during the experiment. Performance pay was calculated based on following instructions
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and performance on the REMEG (i.e., cumulative payoff and deductions for incorrect
arithmetic problem solutions). Participants were informed about the performance pay in
the experimental instructions.
Materials
The entire experiment was run on computers, which consisted of the REMEG and
trait questionnaires. Both the REMEG and trait questionnaires were programmed and run
on the O-tree studio platform (Chen et al., 2016) using a Heroku server. Links to the
study were provided to participants recruited through MTurk.
Design
The experiment had a 4 (counterfactual condition) x 2 (player type) x 20 (round)
mixed design with condition and player type as between subjects’ independent variables,
and round as a within-subjects independent variable. Participants were randomly assigned
to counterfactual conditions and played the game with three bots that had the same design
for all conditions. In an exploratory analysis, signaler was included as a between
subjects’ independent variable after collapsing conditions. Effort selections were the
main dependent variable for the REMEG, but exploratory analyses included payoff, and
two metrics derived from effort: distance from the minimum and intergroup variance. For
the effort-related traits, the scale scores were the dependent measures. Participants were
randomly pre-assigned to counterfactual conditions
Procedure
Participants read a consent form, received instructions, and were informed about
their compensation. Participants completed the REMEG and trait measures, which lasted
approximately 25 minutes.
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REMEG. The REMEG procedure was the same as the first experiment except for
the addition of the instruction quiz, manipulation check, and counterfactual page shown
after the results of each round. Although participants played the REMEG with three bots,
the game procedure remained the same. The instructions informed participants they are
playing a game with three other players to reduce any potential effects from explicitly
telling participants they are playing with bots.
Results
The nested ANOVAs and correlational analyses were performed using MatLab
version R2020a and all linear effects modeling was conducted using R version 4.0.3 with
the lmerTest (cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lmerTest) and r2glmm statistical packages
(github.com/bcjaeger/r2glmm).
Instruction Quiz and Manipulation Check
Before running analyses, the instruction quiz and manipulation check were
explored (see Figure 20). Participants took the instruction quiz immediately after
instructions and were given feedback. In addition, participants were shown the payoff
matrix at the start and end of each round. Participants passed if they answered at least two
of the three questions correctly. More than half of the participants failed the instruction
quiz. However, a linear mixed effects model for average human effort with condition and
instruction quiz as factors, and group as a random variable, revealed no main effect of
instruction quiz or interaction with condition. The manipulation check results were less
straightforward. Participants passed the manipulation check if their answer corresponded
to their experimental condition and about 70% of participants failed. However, the same
linear mixed effects model for manipulation check did not reveal any effects or
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interactions. Furthermore, participants gave similar answers for the manipulation check
and a Chi-squared test revealed there were no differences in answers between conditions,
χ2(4, N = 259) = 4.54, p = .34.

Figure 20. Proportion of participants (N = 260) that passed and failed the instruction quiz
(left), and the manipulation check (center). Answers for the manipulation check for each
condition are shown on the right.
Participants were asked two additional questions related to the counterfactual
manipulation (Figure 21). To assess whether participants were using counterfactuals to
inform their choices, they were asked the following opened-ended question: “If you
received them, did the other possible choices and outcomes influence your choices during
the game?”. Only 150 (out of 260) participant’s open-ended answers could be quantified
(e.g., as a yes or no) and approximately 60% them indicated they were not influenced by
counterfactuals. There were no differences in responses between those who passed and
failed the manipulation check. The second related question asked participants whether
they thought more about how they could have made a different choice, how other players
could have made a different choice, or they thought about both equally. This question
was aimed at assessing whether participants were focusing more on their counterfactuals
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relating towards own choices, choices of other, or both. About 30% of participants
answered their own choice or others, and about 40% answered they focused on both
equally. There were no differences in choices between those who failed or passed.

Figure 21. Proportion of participants influenced by counterfactuals (left) and reported
focusing more on their own forgone choices, those of other, or both equally (right).
In addition, time spent on results and counterfactual pages were also explored as a
means of identifying participants who were not paying attention, but this was
inconclusive. Overall, it is not clear why participants failed the manipulation check;
however, the benefits of counterfactuals were not expected to be contingent on
awareness. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to include all of the data for the analyses.
Unique Counterfactuals
Since each player received a unique set of counterfactuals, this was a potential
confound that need to be explored. Unique counterfactuals were quantified for each
participant by subtracting the actual payoff from each counterfactual payoff and the sum
for each round was calculated. A linear mixed effects model was used for counterfactual
payoff difference with condition and round as fixed effects and group as a random
variable (left in Figure 22). The model revealed effects for the downward, β = -57.55,
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t(364) = 10.61, p < .0001, partial R2 = .15, and bidirectional, β = -24.64, t(364) = -7.85, p
< .0001, partial R2 = .031, conditions indicating differences between all conditions with
the downward condition having the lowest counterfactual payoff difference, followed by
the bidirectional condition. In addition, there was an effect for round, β = -.54, t(3740) = 4.92, p < .0001, partial R2 =.004, indicating a negative trend for all conditions for
counterfactual payoff difference. At the individual level, there was no relationship
between player’s average counterfactual payoff difference and average effort, suggesting
it was not a confound (right in Figure 22).

Figure 22. Average counterfactual payoff difference across 20 rounds for counterfactual
conditions (left) and the relationship between each player’s average counterfactual payoff
difference and average effort (right). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Main Analyses
Based on the bot REMEG results from the first experiment where bots
coordinated much faster than humans (e.g., variance dropped below 1 after the 4th round
compared to humans where variance remained between 2 and 3 for the entire game) and
the hypotheses of the second experiment focusing exclusively on coordination efficiency,
coordination or within group variance was not explored any further.
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Effort. A nested ANOVA was used to test the hypotheses, since players were
nested within groups. The nested ANOVA had effort selection as the dependent variable,
condition as the independent variable, and players nested within group as a random
variable. The hypotheses predicted the upward condition to have the highest effort and
the downward condition to have higher effort than the control condition. The nested
ANOVA was significant (left in Figure 23), F(3,1036) = 4.42, p = .004, η2 = .01, and
post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed higher effort in the upward condition (M = 4.47, SD =
1.10) compared to downward (M = 4.13, SD = 1.05), t(1036) = 3.61, p < .001, d = .31.

Figure 23. Average effort (left) and average effort per round for all conditions. Error bars
are 95% confidence intervals.
There were also expectations to see trends across 20 rounds as the first study and
model simulations suggested no differences in first round choices and differences
emerging later around round 5. Here, a linear mixed effects model was used because it
has less restrictive assumptions about variance and repeated measures (e.g., Krueger &
Tian, 2004). Since only human players are unique and differences between conditions
were only present with all player data, player type was added as an interaction term. The
following formula was used: Effort ~ Condition * Round * Player Type + (1 |
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Group/Player), which corresponds to effort as the dependent variable, an interaction
effect for condition, round, and player type, and players nested within group as a random
effect (right in Figure 23). This model serves as the standard for all subsequent analyses.
The model revealed a significant effect for round, β = -.03, t(19750) = -4.89, p <
.0001, partial R2 = .001, indicating a negative trend across rounds for effort. In addition,
there were some significant interaction effects. There was an interaction effect for bots
and the upward condition, β = .422, t(3724) = 3.02, p = .003, partial R2 = .000, indicating
that, on average, bots had higher effort than humans in the upward condition. There was
an interaction effect for the upward condition and round, β = .02, t(19750) = 2.37, p =
.02, partial R2 = .000, and the downward condition and round, β = -.02, t(19750) = -2.02,
p = .04, partial R2 = .000, indicating the weakest negative trend across rounds for the
upward condition and the strongest negative trend for the downward condition. These
same analyses were conducted for payoff as well.
Payoff. Payoff is a function of the player’s choice and the minimum and
therefore, provides additional information about coordination efficiency. A nested
ANOVA for payoff revealed a significant difference between conditions, F(3,1036) =
3.74, p = .01, η2 = .01 (left in Figure 24). Post hoc tests (Tukey HSD) revealed the
upward (M = 80.85, SD = 13.36) and bidirectional (M = 80.40, SD = 15.93) conditions
had a higher average payoff than the downward condition (M = 77.22, SD = 13.85),
t(1036) = 3.01, p = .01, d = .27 and t(1036) = -2.60, p = .05, d = -.21, respectively.
Trends were also expected for payoff and this was assessed with the standard
linear mixed effects model (right in Figure 24). The model revealed a significant effect
for round, β = .97, t(8408) = 10.68, p = .02, partial R2 = .004, indicating that payoffs had
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a positive trend over time. There were also significant effects for round and the
downward condition, β = -.33, t(19750) = -2.65, p = .01, partial R2 = .000, and
bidirectional condition, β = .28, t(19750) = 2.21, p = .03, partial R2 =.000, indicating that
the downward condition had the weakest positive trend and bidirectional the strongest.
Lastly, there was a significant interaction effect for the upward condition and bot, β = 4.22, t(8408) = -2.34, p = .02, partial R2 =.000, indicating that humans had higher payoffs
than bots in the upward condition.

Figure 24. Average payoff (left) and average payoff per round for all conditions (right).
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Exploratory Analyses
Comparing Humans and Agents. Groups were comprised of one human and
three bots, and there was an effect for player type where bots appeared to choose higher
effort than humans. To better understand this unexpected result, signaling behavior was
explored. Signaling behavior was quantified by subtracting each player’s choice by the
minimum to get the distance from the minimum for each round, which is informative
about instances of signaling and its strength (i.e., costliness). The standard linear mixed
effects model with distance from the minimum as the dependent variable revealed an
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effect for round, β = .064, t(19750) = -10.49, p < .0001, partial R2 = .005, indicating a
negative trend across rounds. In addition, there was an effect for the upward condition, β
= -.35, t(3018) = -2.71, p = .007, partial R2 = .001, and an interaction effect for the
upward condition and bots, β = .42, t(3622) = 3.04, p = .002, partial R2 = .001, suggesting
the upward condition effect was driven by the counterfactual manipulation and the effect
of human signaling on the bots’ behavior in the upward condition (Figure 25).

Figure 25. Average distance from the minimum across 20 rounds for all conditions (left)
and player type (right). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
These results suggest that signaling behavior is not independent of condition and
bot’s signaling behavior may be more frequent than humans. However, bots were by
design, not capable of signaling like humans. Signaling is effective if it influences other
players to choose higher effort, which brings up the minimum and therefore potential
payoffs for all players. Signaling is often more effective when it is known to be costly to
the signaler and persists over time as it has delayed effects on other players. Effective
signaling requires short-term costs (i.e., lower payoffs), which are offset by higher
payoffs over time as the minimum increases. Agents only best respond to other players
choices, specifically the minimum and average of all player choices for each round, and
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do not consider the short-term cost of signaling with long-term rewards of higher payoffs.
As bots were based on the EEWA model that considers each players choice as a potential
minimum, the average choice per round is likely more attractive than the actual
minimum. Also, the actual payoff received is weighted higher than all forgone payoffs,
which can make previous round choices more attractive than forgone choices. Therefore,
it is possible that bots engage in signaling-like behavior more than humans due to their
stickiness to average effort and previous choices. This explanation was explored with a
linear mixed effects model for average distance from the average. As the main interest in
whether bots stuck closer to the average than humans, the model only included round and
player type as interaction effects (i.e., condition was dropped). There was a significant
effect for bots, β = .24, t(4445) = 5.74, p < .0001, partial R2 = .002, indicating that bots
had higher average distance from the minimum compared to humans (Figure 26). On
average, bots’ choices were every close to the average without much deviation. This is
because bots are based on the EEWA model and consider all player choices as potential
minimums, making it more likely to converge towards the average rather than minimum.

Figure 26. Average distance from the average across 20 rounds for player type. Error
bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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To further explore differences between human signaling and the signaling-like
behavior of bots, additional linear mixed effects models were run. Players were identified
as signalers if their distance from the minimum was above zero for at least 5 rounds in a
row. Five was chosen after exploration of a number of criteria (e.g., self-report
measures), correspondence with previous literature (e.g., Brandts et al., 2014, 2015), and
it provided the most even split between signalers and non-signalers. The standard linear
mixed effects model was used for to explore effort and payoff with signalers replacing
condition (i.e., Effort ~ Round * Signaler * Player type + (1 | Group/Player)). Since the
effects for round and player type, and their interaction effect were already discussed for
effort and payoff, they are left out here. There were several interaction effects for effort,
which are included in Table 2. For simplicity, only the three-way interaction for bot,
round, and signaler, β = -.10, t(19760) = -14.52, p < .0001, partial R2 = .006, is reported.
Table 2.
Results of linear mixed effects model with effort as the dependent variable, round,
signaler, player type as factors, and players nested within group as a random effect.
Effect
(Model)
(Intercept)
PlayerType(bot)
Round
Signaler(yes)
PlayerType(bot):Round
PlayerType(bot):Signaler(yes)
Round:Signaler(yes)
PlayerType(bot):Round:Signaler(yes)

Estimate

Std. Error

df

t-value

p-value

4.23
-0.16
-0.04
0.57
0.05
0.43
0.04
-0.1

0.08
0.06
0
0.08
0
0.1
0.01
0.01

677
4996
19760
4840
19760
4175
19760
19760

53.98
-2.54
-11.55
6.88
10.84
4.38
6.91
-14.52

2.0e-16***
1.1e-2*
2.0e-16***
6.9e-12***
2.0e-16***
1.2e-5***
5.1e-12***
2.0e-16***

R-squared
0.055

CI-lower
0.049

CI-upper
0.061

0
0.004
0.002
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.006

0
0.002
0.001
0.002
0
0.001
0.004

0.001
0.006
0.003
0.005
0.002
0.003
0.008

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

The three-way interaction for effort reveals differences between signalers and
non-signalers, however, that difference is greater for humans compared to bots (left in
Figure 27). Similarly, the model for payoff revealed several effects and interaction effects
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(Table 3) and the same three-way interaction for bot, round, and signaler, β = -1.48,
t(20530) = -14.07, p < .0001, partial R2 = .006.
Table 3.
Results of linear mixed effects model with payoff as the dependent variable, round,
signaler, player type as factors, and players nested within group as a random effect.
Effect
(Model)
(Intercept)
PlayerType(bot)
Round
Signaler(yes)
PlayerType(bot):Round
PlayerType(bot):Signaler(yes)
Round:Signaler(yes)
PlayerType(bot):Round:Signaler(yes)
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Estimate

Std. Error

df

t-value

p-value

78.60
-10.63
0.56
-19.30
0.73
20.37
0.96
-1.48

1.07
0.88
0.06
1.13
0.07
1.34
0.09
0.11

723
20630
20530
20630
20530
20690
20530
20530

73.67
-12.13
9.81
-17.05
10.33
15.18
10.56
-14.07

2.0e-16***
2.0e-16***
2.0e-16***
2.0e-16***
2.0e-16***
2.0e-16***
2.0e-16***
2.0e-16***

R-squared
0.078

CI-lower
0.071

CI-upper
0.085

0.005
0.003
0.01
0.003
0.008
0.004
0.006

0.003
0.002
0.007
0.002
0.006
0.002
0.004

0.007
0.005
0.013
0.005
0.011
0.005
0.009

The three-way interaction for payoff reveals differences between signalers and
non-signalers for both humans and bots (right in Figure 27). Human signalers showed the
expected pattern of short-term costs (i.e., lower payoffs) with the long-term benefit of
higher payoffs over time by surpassing that of non-signalers.

Figure 27. Average payoff per round for humans (black) and bots (gray) that were
classified as signalers (dotted line) and non-signalers (solid line). Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
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However, differences between bot “signalers” and “non-signalers” highlighted the
artificiality of their signaling-like behavior as “non-signalers” earned higher payoffs than
signalers”, likely due to their choice stickiness. Agent’s signaling was artificial and
human signalers showed the expected cost of signaling with the long-term benefits of
higher payoffs. In addition, humans were the only unique players in the group. Therefore,
it was valuable to explore how human signaling affected group effort and payoff (Figure
28). Linear mixed effects models were run for average group effort (left) and payoff
(right) with round and signaler as factors, and group as a random variable (i.e., Average
group effort ~ Round * Signaler + (1 | Group)).

Figure 28. Average payoff per round for groups with human signalers (solid line) and
non-signalers (dotted line). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
For average group effort, there were effects for round, β = -.045, t(4938) = -10.3,
p < .0001, partial R2 = .013, and signaler, β = 1.38, t(403) = 8.53, p < .0001, partial R2 =
.032, indicating an average negative linear trend for average group effort across rounds
and higher average group effort for groups with human signalers. There was also an
interaction effect for round and signaler, β = .043, t(4938) = 6.16, p < .0001, partial R2 =
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.005, indicating a positive linear trend for average group effort for signalers, and a
negative trend for non-signalers.
The same effects and interacting effects were found for average group payoff. The
effects for round, β = .56, t(4938) = 10.57, p < .0001, partial R2 = .016, and signaler, β = 7.25, t(519) = -4.47, p < .0001, partial R2 = .007, indicated an average positive linear
trend for average group payoff across rounds and higher average group payoff for groups
with human signalers. The interaction effect for round and signaler, β = .96, t(4938) =
11.38, p < .0001, partial R2 = .018, indicated a stronger positive linear trend for average
group effort for signalers, compared to non-signalers. These results suggest that on
average the human was able to influence the group to choose higher effort by signaling,
and the human signaling resulted in higher payoffs over time for the group.
Discussion
In the main analyses, there was evidence suggesting counterfactual nudging can
increase coordination efficiency. The hypotheses predicted nudging in the form of
counterfactuals to influence coordination efficiency with the upward condition having the
highest effort and the control the lowest. The nested ANOVA only revealed differences
between the upward and downward conditions. The linear mixed effects model extended
the nested ANOVA findings by revealing different linear trends across rounds for the
upward and downward conditions. In addition, bots had higher effort than humans in the
upward condition. This provides evidence that counterfactual nudging influenced
coordination efficiency and that humans and bots behaved differently, however, the effect
sizes were small. Prior to collecting data, there was concern that counterfactual nudging
effects would be weakened since only the human received the manipulation. Although
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there was supporting evidence for counterfactual nudging, the small effect sizes support
that concern. Interestingly, average effort was higher than expected in the control
condition. There were no counterfactuals or additional outcome information beyond the
minimum, however, the control condition was almost identical to the bidirectional
condition and had higher effort (not significant) than the downward condition.
Furthermore, although all the data was included, the fact that 70% of the
participants failed the manipulation check and about half failed the instruction quiz was
still concerning. This could be due to participants not taking the experiment seriously, not
paying attention to the counterfactuals, getting confused by the counterfactual
manipulation (suggested by similar answers across conditions), or generating their own
counterfactuals and ignoring the ones provided. It might also relate to metacognition,
specifically how players form beliefs about themselves and others, and whether they can
accurately update them over time. It is possible that participants were influenced by
counterfactuals but were not aware of how it influenced their behavior. If that is the case,
they may have been less able to form accurate beliefs about other players, which would
reduce their ability to make appropriate choices to improve their payoffs.
In the exploratory analyses, evidence suggested that (1) humans and bots behaved
differently in respect to effort, payoff, and signaling, and (2) one human signaler, in a
group of three equivalent bots, increased coordination efficiency. The linear mixed
effects model with distance from the minimum revealed a weak relationship with
condition, as there was one interaction effect (i.e., upward condition and bots). Signaling
could be seen as individuals nudging each other and may have been stronger or at least
additive to counterfactual nudges. This could be due to counterfactuals lacking context
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beyond the minimum, since all player choices were shown on the results page prior to
counterfactuals. Signaling could help explain why the control condition performed better
than expected. Although there were no counterfactuals, signaling was still possible and,
without information of all player choices, players could not properly assess signaling
effectiveness and if or when to give it up. Furthermore, bots in the control condition had
access to all player choices, which could have helped keep effort higher and more stable.
Player type differences were found in the main analysis with effort and
exploratory analysis with distance from the minimum, where bots had higher average
effort and distance from the minimum than humans. In addition, an analysis with average
distance from the average revealed that bots stuck very close to the average for all 20
rounds, suggesting they were more influenced by the average than the minimum or higher
choices potentially related to signaling. To better understand these differences, these
findings were followed up with exploratory analyses by classifying signalers and
including it as a factor in separate linear mixed effects models with effort and payoff as
dependent variables. For effort, “signaling” and “non-signaling” bot’s effort choices were
similar, whereas signaling human’s effort was about 1.5 effort units higher than nonsignaling humans. For payoff, signaling humans increased their payoff over time,
compared to non-signaling humans who flattened out after about 5 rounds. On the other
hand, “signaling” bots had the lowest payoffs and “non-signaling” bots had the highest.
Also, there were more bot “signalers” (62%) compared to humans (39%). The differences
between signaling and non-signaling humans is the expected pattern for effective
signaling behavior. However, the behavior of signaling and non-signaling bots is unusual.
As previously mentioned, bots signaling-like behavior is merely an artifact of the
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influence of mode(s) and previous choices. That being said, bot’s choices could often be
maladaptive in terms of their payoff and the coordination efficiency of the group.
The linear mixed effects models with signaling as a factor revealed differences
between signaling and non-signaling humans and bots for both effort and payoff.
However, since only humans are capable of signaling, subsequent exploratory analysis
were used to explore the behavior of groups with signaling and non-signaling humans.
The linear mixed effects models revealed groups with signaling humans had significantly
higher effort and payoffs compared to groups with non-signaling humans. This result is
promising because it suggests that the single human in the group had awareness of the
need for signaling persistence and succeeded in influencing the behavior of three
equivalent bots, regardless of counterfactual nudges.
Overall, the results are somewhat promising for counterfactual nudging and more
so for signaling. The cards were stacked against the human since bots did not receive
counterfactuals, were not capable of signaling, and may be hard to influence. There was
some evidence that upward counterfactuals nudged humans towards choosing higher
effort and this influenced the group. Furthermore, signaling humans were able to nudge
bots towards more efficient choices regardless of experimental condition. A follow up
study is necessary to rule out potential confounds by: (1) developing more human-like
bots capable of signaling and giving them counterfactuals, or using four-human groups,
(2) giving all players in the control condition the same information, (3) providing a
clearer counterfactual manipulation with relationships to group behavior (e.g., if other
players had chosen one effort unit higher, you would have earned X), and (4) finding a
better way to assess whether participants paid attention and followed instructions.
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IV.

A Cognitive Model of the MEG

The first experiment suggested counterfactuals improved coordination efficiency
and helped keep it stable over time, compared to previous experiments (Leng et al., 2018;
van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991). The second experiment supported and extended this
finding by revealing that counterfactuals, specifically upward and downward, can nudge
individuals and influence coordination efficiency. Furthermore, players (i.e., humans)
appeared to nudge other players (i.e., bots) to choose higher effort by signaling. However,
groups in the second experiment were comprised of one human and three EEWA bots
that did not receive counterfactuals, were not capable of signaling, and exhibited artificial
choice stickiness. These behavioral constraints of the bots reduce the generalizability to
groups comprised of humans. Unfortunately, there were issues with completing a follow
up experiment with four human groups and there were additional constraints due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, instead of a third experiment using the same EEWA
bots, a new model was developed with the intention to better capture and simulate human
behavior and cognitive processes. As described in both previous experiments, the EEWA
was an improvement over EWA, but it lacked the capability to form beliefs about or
predict other players choices and there was frequent maladaptive choice stickiness. The
EEWA model was able to approximate average behavior, but not the group dynamics
observed in all human groups. In addition, the mathematical equations and parameters in
EWA and EEWA had some psychological correspondence, but overall, lacked cognitive
plausibility. The new model addresses these deficiencies and includes: 1) counterpart
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choice predictions, 2) decision strategies, 3) counterfactual thinking (i.e., mental
simulation), and 4) the capability to fit both average behavior and group dynamics. Due
to its capabilities, the model is referred to as the prediction, strategy, and simulation
model (i.e., PSS). The PSS model was implemented in a cognitive architecture,
specifically ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson, 2009). To thoroughly
evaluate the model, it was fit to the 4-human group data from the first experiment and
compared to the EWA and EEWA models. The development of the PSS model, its main
mechanisms, and a detailed description of the model processes are discussed, starting
with a brief overview of the ACT-R architecture.
The ACT-R Architecture
ACT-R is a unified theory of cognition used to develop models of various tasks
and phenomena (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Anderson, 2007). It is a
hybrid architecture with both symbolic and sub-symbolic structures and is composed of
modules, which represent the systems of the mind. Each module possesses a buffer that
serves as the interaction interface between modules and the contents of the buffers
represent the current state of the model. There are several perceptual-motor modules
(e.g., visual, motor, aural, and vocal) and two types of memory modules (i.e., declarative
and procedural). The PSS model uses the goal, imaginal, declarative, and procedural
modules. The goal module is used to determine what the model is currently focused on
and the imaginal module is used to temporarily store information similar to visual shortterm memory. The declarative memory module represents facts in long term memory that
are stored as chunks and a sub-symbolic component determines the behavior of the
memory system (e.g., the likelihood a chunk can be retrieved). The procedural module
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represents knowledge about how to do things, which are represented as condition-action
rules. The pattern matcher of the procedural module determines which, if any, rules
match the current state of the buffers. If the condition of the production matches the
current state, then it “fires” and the action changes the state of the model. The behavior of
a model is represented as a series of production firings and corresponding changes to the
state of the model.
The PSS Model
The main components of the PSS model include: predictions about other players,
strategies, and learning. At the end of each round in the MEG, players are shown the
choices of all players and receive feedback in the form of payoffs. Players accumulate
information over time, are better able to predict other player’s choices, and identify
which strategies tend to result in higher payoffs. The instance-based learning approach
(IBL; Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003) is used as a framework for how players
accumulate and leverage this information. In IBL, information is stored as instance
chunks, which include the situation, decision, and value of the decision in that situation.
In typical IBL models (e.g., Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003), instances are
accumulated and leveraged to determine which decision leads to the highest utility for a
given situation, resulting in a transition from relying on productions to relying on
declarative memory. However, the PSS model uses a slightly different approach (e.g.,
Juvina, Lebiere, & Gonzalez, 2015). Instances store more information about the situation,
are used only to make predictions about other players, and decisions remain a function of
procedural memory (in combination with player choice predictions). In addition, there is
no defined stopping rule regarding when to stop considering all possible decisions prior
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to making a decision. Instead, a strategy is chosen and a decision is made in combination
with player choice predictions, then the unchosen strategies are simulated to represent
counterfactual thinking. In the PSS model, learning about counterparts is a function of
declarative memory, and learning which strategies have higher utilities (i.e., rewards) is a
function of procedural memory. These learning processes are discussed in more detail
separately in the following sections, followed by a complete description of the model.
Player Choice Predictions and Declarative Memory
In the minimum effort game, players often have delayed responses to the choices
of other players since they make choices simultaneously and often make choices in
response to the previous round. Therefore, predicting what players are going to do
involves how players react to previous rounds and tracking reactions over time. In the
PSS model, round outcomes are stored as instances that contain all player choices from
the previous round [t - 1], all player choices from the current round (t), the decision for
the current round (t), and the payoff of the current round (t). Storing the previous round
choices and the subsequent round choices carries information about how players choices
change from one round to another.
In the model, player choice predictions involve recognizing a situation (i.e.,
previous round choices) by finding an instance that has corresponding previous choices
(i.e., choices [t - 1]) and using the known subsequent choices or reactions in the instance
(i.e., choices [t]) to make predictions. In retrieval terms, this means that previous round
choices are the retrieval cues, choices [t – 1] are the target in the instance chunk, and
choices [t] in the instance chunk are the values of interest within that instance chunk. As
more instances are accumulated, there is more information to leverage and predict if and
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how player’s choices vary across rounds. Rather than just recalling an instance from
memory, the blending mechanism (Lebiere, 1999) is used here to aggregate information
from all previous instances and serves as player choice predictions. Before describing the
blending mechanism, it’s important to first consider activation. Every instance (i.e.,
chunk) has an associated activation, which helps determines the likelihood of its retrieval.
The activation of a chunk is determined by the activation equation (equation 4).
(4)

𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

The activation of a chunk, 𝐴𝑖 , is a function of the: 1) base level term, 𝐵𝑖 , that
represents recency and chunk use, 2) spreading term, 𝑆𝑖 , that represents context effects, 3)
partial matching term, 𝑃𝑖 , that represents how well the chunk matches the retrieval cues,
and 4) noise term, 𝜀𝑖 , that represents variability in memory. However, for simplicity the
PSS model uses blending instead of retrieval and therefore only includes the partial
matching, 𝑃𝑖 , and error, 𝜀𝑖 , terms of the activation equation. The partial matching term
was set to 1 (default is 0) and functions as a mismatch penalty for chunks (i.e., magnitude
of the mismatching chunk activation is reduced) that are not an exact match to the
retrieval request cues. The partial matching term was kept low, compared to the value of
10 used in Lebiere (1999), since the model does not start with instances and there are
only 20 rounds. If partial matching was higher, mismatching chunks would be penalized
more and fewer chunks would have an impact on the blended player choice predictions.
The error term was left at its default value of 1. The error represents the standard
deviation in a normal distribution with a mean of 0. A value is randomly sampled from
this distribution and adds random noise or variation to activation.
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Contrary to standard retrieval, which retrieves one chunk based on retrieval cues
and activation, the blending mechanism retrieves a compromise value for all possible
values of interest weighted by their probability of retrieval. This is accomplished with
equation 5, which produces a value that minimizes the sum of all squared dissimilarities
for values, (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑉, 𝑉𝑖 ))2, of each chunk, i, and weights it by its probability of
retrieval, 𝑃𝑖 (equation 6). The probability of retrieval is a function of the match score for
a chunk, 𝑒

𝑀𝑖⁄
𝑡,

that represents the degree of match between the retrieval cues and the

target information in the chunk. The match score is normalized by the total match score
of all retrieved chunks, ∑𝑗 𝑒
(5)
(6)

𝑀𝑗
⁄𝑡
.

𝑉 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑𝑖 𝑃𝑖 ∗ (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑚(𝑉, 𝑉𝑖 ))2
𝑃𝑖 =

𝑒

𝑀𝑖
⁄𝑡

∑𝑗 𝑒

𝑀𝑗
⁄
𝑡

(i.e., Boltzmann equation)

Blending can deal with different types of variables; however, the discussion is
restricted to the integer values used in the PSS model. When using integers, the
compromise value is the sum of all chunk values of interest weighted by their probability
of retrieval (normalized). If two chunks in memory: Chunk A has target of 2 and value of
3, and chunk B has a target of 3 and value of 4. If the retrieval cue was 2.1, then the
probability of retrieval for chunk A is going to be higher and its value will receive more
weight. Let’s say that the probability of retrieval for chunk A is .9 and .1 for chunk B.
The blended value is then the sum of each chunk’s value weighted by its respective
probability of retrieval (equation 7).
(7)

(3 * .9) + (4 * .1) = 3.1
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As mentioned, in the PSS model the blending mechanism produces player choice
predictions by leveraging the instances in memory. At the start of a new round, player
choices from the previous round are used as retrieval cues and the blending module
retrieves instances that have matching or similar values in the target slots representing
choices at time [t - 1] (see Figure 26). The values for time [t] are blended by multiplying
the set of player choices for time [t] by their own probability of retrieval and calculating
the sum. Equation 8 below is an example expression of how three sets of player choices
would be blended to produce player choice predictions.
(8a)
(8b)

([4 4 5 6] * .7) + ([2 4 5 4] * .2) + ([2 3 4 3] * .1) =
[2.8 2.8 3.5 4.2] + [.4 .8 1 .8] + [.2 .3 .4 .3] =
(8c)

[3.4 3.9 4.9 5.3] =
(8d)

[3 4 5 5]

In expression 8a there are three sets of player choices, in brackets, being
multiplied by their probability of retrieval (e.g., expression 6) and expression 8b shows
the product for each player choice in that set. Next, each specific player choice for each
set is summed (expression 8c). Lastly, these summed player choices are rounded to get
discrete integers that corresponded to effort choices (expression 5d). Notice how these
blended values are unique and represent all the information in chunks weighted by their
degree of match to the retrieval cues, which is formally represented by the probability of
retrieval. These blended values then serve as the prediction for players choices for the
next round. Just like retrieval requests, blending can fail if the activation for the blended
chunk is below the activation threshold (default of 0). The activation of the blended
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chunk is a function of the activation of all chunks that were blended. If it fails, then the
model uses the choices from the previous round as player choice predictions (Figure 29).

Figure 29. Depiction of how instances are used to predict player choice patterns with
blending.
Player Choice Strategies and Procedural Memory
In order to make a choice, players use some kind of strategy or rule based on
preferences or previous experience. There are, of course, several ways to interpret how
players make choices and if there are changes over time. The EWA model uses choices
and the most “attractive” choice at a given point in time is selected. Attractions for all
choices are updated at the end of each round based on the reward for the actual choice
and lower weighted payoffs for all forgone choices (i.e., choices not made). There are
two potential side effects of this approach: EWA bots may stick close to previous choices
since forgone choices receive a fraction of the payoff and bots are likely to be pulled
towards the minimum because it leads to the highest payoff possible. The EEWA model
was developed to improve the coordination ability of the EWA model, reduce choice
stickiness, and reduce the pull towards the minimum by considering each player’s choice
as a potential minimum. However, this has computation costs as the EEWA model
considers the actual outcome and 27 forgone ones. To reduce this computation cost and
incorporate unique player choice predictions for each player, the PSS model uses a
combination of player choice predictions and strategies to make choices. As outlined in
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the previous section, at the start of a new round, the PSS model uses instances and
blending in order to predict player choices. These predictions are then used in
combination with strategies to make a choice. The model includes four strategies: 1) the
min-strategy selects the lowest predicted choice, 2) the ave-strategy selects the average
predicted choice, 3) the max-strategy selects the highest predicted choice, and 4) the
signal-strategy selects one higher than the average predicted choice. Once a strategy is
selected and all other players have made a choice, then the model receives feedback and
updates the utility of the chosen strategy based on the actual (not predicted) outcome.
Strategy utility is updated using the ACT-R utility learning equation (equation 9).
(9)

𝑈𝑖 (𝑛) = 𝑈𝑖 (𝑛 − 1) + 𝛼[𝑅𝑖 (𝑛) − 𝑈𝑖 (𝑛 − 1)]

In the utility learning equation, the current utility, 𝑈𝑖 (𝑛), is a function of: 1) the
previous utility value, 𝑈𝑖 (𝑛 − 1), 2) the utility learning rate, 𝛼, and 3) the current reward
value, 𝑅𝑖 (𝑛). In addition, there is an optional noise component that can be added to
utilities, which adds some stochasticity (Anderson, 2007). When the utility is updated, the
previous utility is added to the difference between the current reward and the previous
utility multiplied by the utility learning rate. For example, if the previous utility of a
strategy is equal to 70, a new reward of 100 is received after using that strategy, and the
learning rate was .2 (i.e., default value in ACT-R), then the updated utility would be:
(10)

70 + (.2 ∗ (100 − 70)) = 76

Notice that even though the most recent reward is 30 more than the previous
utility, the new utility only changes by 6. This is because the learning rate is set at .2, so
only 20% of the difference between previous utility and current reward is added to the
previous utility. If the reward for this strategy continued to be 100, it would take 19
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updates until the current utility would be equal to the reward of 100 (after rounding up).
Therefore, the first or starting utility of a strategy is important as it influences which
strategies are initially selected and how quickly utilities changes over time. In the PSS
model, there are two different patterns of starting strategy utilities that represent the two
most commonly discussed player types in the MEG: risk and payoff dominant (e.g., van
Huyck et al.,1990, 1991). A risk dominant player (i.e., RD) is motivated to reduce risk or
potential cost and would prefer choosing lower effort as there is less potential risk (e.g.,
choosing 1 guarantees a payoff of 70). A payoff dominant (i.e., PD) player is more
willing to take risk in order to seek higher rewards (e.g., choosing 7 can result in the
highest payoff of 130 or the lowest of 10). The RD player type is approximated by
organizing strategies along a riskiness continuum (i.e., min, ave, max, and signal) and
setting the min-strategy at the highest attainable payoff (i.e., 130) and linearly decreasing
utilities along this riskiness continuum (Figure 30). The PD player type is defined as the
opposite of risk dominant.

Figure 30. Line plot showing starting strategy utilities for RD and PD player types.
In the PSS model, payoffs are the rewards given to strategies and the utility of all
strategies are updated each round. To add some stochasticity, the noise component is
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added to the utility equation. The noise component for utility is the same as activation
noise (i.e., values sampled form a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and standard
deviation equal to the noise value) and the default value is 1. However, since payoffs can
be as high as 130, the noise component had to be higher as well. In the model, the noise
component was a free parameter that was determined to be 7.5 through model fitting. On
a given round, the strategy with the highest utility is chosen and the player choice
predictions are used to determine the choice along with the chosen strategy. Although the
chosen strategy uses player choice predictions, it receives a reward equal to the payoff
earned at the end of the round based on the real player choices. For instance, if player
choice predictions were 2, 3, 5, 6 and the average strategy was used, the choice would be
4. If the actual player choices were 3, 3, 5, 6, then the minimum of 3 and choice of 4
would result in a payoff of 80, instead of 60 if the minimum was 2 as predicted. After the
chosen strategy receives a reward, the model engages in counterfactual thinking and
simulates outcomes for the unchosen strategies in the same manner (i.e., using player
choice predictions and real player choices determine the payoff). However, the unchosen
strategies receive a fraction of the payoff that could have been earned to better
correspond to counterfactual thinking (Byrne, 2016; Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and the
idea that it is treated differently than actual outcomes (Camerer & Ho, 1999). In the PSS
model, unchosen strategies receive 75% of the forgone payoff (e.g., payoff * .75) and this
is referred to as the counterfactual weight in the model. Following from the example
above, when updating the utility of the unchosen max-strategy, this would mean choosing
the predicted highest choice of 6 and receiving a weighted payoff of 45 (60 *.75) based
on the actual minimum of 3.
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Complete Model Description
So far, the declarative and procedural components of the model have been
discussed separately. In this section the complete model is described, starting with the
model parameters.
Model Parameters. The declarative memory component of the model has two
architectural parameters: partial matching and activation noise. Since there is not default
for partial matching, it was a free parameter determined to be 1 through model fitting.
Setting it at 1 minimized the mismatch penalty so that all chunks can influence player
choice predictions since there are no instance in declarative memory at the start of the
game and there are only 20 rounds. Activation noise is required for blending and was left
at its default value of 1. For the procedural memory, there are two fixed architectural
parameters (i.e., utility learning rate and utility noise) and two parameters based on
theoretically justified assumptions (i.e., starting utilities and counterfactual weight). The
utility learning rate is set at the default value of .2 and utility noise was scaled up to better
correspond to payoff values and was set at 7.5 (i.e., default is 1) during model fitting. The
counterfactual weight (i.e., cfw) parameter was added to differentially weight payoffs for
simulated strategies during counterfactual thinking. The cfw parameter was set to .75 so
that counterfactual payoffs have 75% of the value as actual payoffs. There are two player
types that correspond to a pattern of starting strategy utilities and they can compose five
unique groups. In the final model run, there were slightly more PD player types (57%)
resulting in uneven unique group frequencies (Table 4), suggesting that there might be
more PD than RD player types in the sample. The model was modified to consistently
reproduce these frequencies.

101

Table 4.

Unique Groups

All possible groups with risk and payoff dominant player types.

Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5

Player 1
Risk
Payoff
Payoff
Payoff
Payoff

Unique Players in Group
Player 2
Player 3
Risk
Risk
Risk
Risk
Payoff
Risk
Payoff
Payoff
Payoff
Payoff

Player 4
Risk
Risk
Risk
Risk
Payoff

Group Frequency
2.0%
23.0%
32.0%
35.0%
8.0%

Model Processes. The model goes through the same general process for each
round; however, the first round is unique. During the first round, the model randomly
selects a player type, predicts choices for the three other players, and makes a choice. As
mentioned, one of the two possible player types is randomly selected. The player choice
predictions and choice of the model are randomly sampled from the probability
distribution of pooled human first round choices from both the first and second
experiment. Once all players make a first round choice, the model skips the situation
recognition and instance blending (i.e., declarative memory), and strategy productions
(i.e., procedural memory) in order to move directly to the results. For all subsequent
rounds, the model goes through the same general process, which is now described in
detail (Figure 31). After the first round, the model is focused on actual player choices
from the end of the last round, which are stored in the goal buffer. The model then
attempts to recognize the situation by making a blending request with those player
choices as retrieval cues. The partial matching parameter penalizes mismatching chunks
so that the best matching chunks carry more weight in the blended choices and activation
noise is added to the activation equation that determines the blended chunk’s activation.
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Figure 31. Simplified diagram of the PSS model processes (see Legend).
If blending is successful (i.e., the blended chunk’s activation is above the default
threshold of 0), the blended choices replace the last round choices in the goal buffer and
represent player choice predictions. If blending is not successful (i.e., the blended
chunk’s activation is below the threshold), then last round choices are not replaced in the
goal buffer and serve as the player choice predictions. In both cases a chunk is created in
the imaginal buffer to store last round choices in a new instance (i.e., player choices [t 1]). Next, the model selects the strategy (i.e., min, ave, max, or signal) that has the
highest utility and uses those player choice predictions to make a choice. If one or more
counterparts are taking longer to make a choice, the model waits. After all counterparts
have made a choice, the model moves to the results and is “shown” all player choices, its
own payoff, and a reward is triggered equal to that payoff. Although the choice was
determined by the player choice predictions, the reward is determined by the actual
player choices and is a function of the minimum and the distance from the minimum. The
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utility of the chosen strategy is updated using the utility equation that includes the
previous utility, the reward, the learning rate (i.e., .2), and the utility learning noise (i.e.,
7.5). In addition, during the results production, information is added to complete the
instance chunk in the imaginal buffer, including the new player choices (i.e., player
choices [t]), the decision made by the model (i.e., decision [t]), and the payoff (i.e.,
payoff [t]). However, the predicted player choices remain in the goal buffer and the
instance chunk remains in the imaginal buffer so that counterfactual thinking can take
place. Next, the unchosen strategies are simulated one at time using the player choice
predictions, that are still in the goal buffer, in the same manner as actual strategies. The
forgone payoffs, based on the actual choices stored in the imaginal buffer, are weighted
by the cfw parameter (i.e., .75) and are used as the reward in the utility equation to update
the utility of the strategy productions. Once all the unchosen strategies are simulated, the
model stops counterfactual thinking. The model replaces the player choice predictions in
the goal buffer with the actual choices from the current round, that are stored in the
imaginal buffer, so they can be used at the start of the next round. The instance chunk is
then cleared from the imaginal buffer and is added to declarative memory. At this point,
the round ends, and the model repeats the whole process again for subsequent rounds.
PSS Model Results
The PSS model was fit to the 4-human group data from the first experiment.
There were few groups for MEG-first (n = 8) and DST-first conditions (n = 10), so the
data was pooled (N= 18). The PSS model had a good fit to the pooled data for average
effort, r(38) = .4, RMSE = .27, but the fit to variance was less than desired, r(38) = -.13,
RMSE = 1.6 (left in Figure 32).
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Figure 32. Average effort and variance across 20 rounds for PSS model and human data
(left) and relationship between average group effort and variance for PSS model and
human data (right).
The decrease in variance over time for the PSS model suggests that individual
models (i.e., players) were better able to coordinate over time compared to humans. This
pattern was also observed in the first experiment where there was no difference in effort,
but bot groups (i.e., one human and three EEWA bots) had lower variance than all-human
groups since the EEWA bots were conducive to coordination. In addition to average
effort and variance, behavior was also explored at the group level by comparing the
relationship between average group effort and variance (right in Figure 32). There was a
strong negative correlation between average group effort and variance for the PSS model,
r(98) = -.48, p < .0001, compared to the non-significant, negative relationship with the
human data, r(16) = -.38, p = .12.
So far, the PSS model appears to have a relatively good fit to average effort and
captures the relationship between average group effort and variance. However, average
behavior and average group behavior can be misleading, and there was a discrepancy
with average variance across 20 rounds. Therefore, group dynamics are explored. In
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PSS Model

Figure 33, the average effort of eight different 4-human groups is shown (left) and they
can be qualitatively compared to the average effort of eight different PSS model groups
(right).

Figure 33. Average effort for eight 4-human groups (left) and eight 4-PSS model groups
(right).
About three of the eight human groups displayed dramatic fluctuations in effort
and the remaining five groups were more stable. The PSS model groups show fluctuation,
but lack these dramatic shifts in average effort. For a more quantitative comparison of
group dynamics, the relationship between average player distance from the minimum
and variance was explored (Figure 34). A player’s average distance from the minimum is
informative for the frequency and magnitude of choices above the minimum and average
player variance shows the consistency or “stickiness” of player choices over time. If a
player had no choice variance and high distance from the minimum, this would suggest
maladaptive behavior. Signaling is costly and results in lower payoffs, however, if the
signaling if effective and other player choose higher, this cost is offset by the resulting
higher payoffs. On the other hand, if a player has no choice variance and low distance
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from the minimum, the player is likely sticking to the minimum regardless of other
players choices.
Human

PSS Model

Figure 34. Scatterplots showing the relationship between average player distance from
the minimum and variance for the human groups (left) and the PSS model groups (right).
There was a significant positive relationship between average player distance
from the minimum and variance for human groups, r(70) = .32, p = .007, and PSS model
groups, r(398) = .54, p < .0001. Humans had higher average player variance (M = 2.77,
SD = 1.87) than the models (M = 1.01, SD = .85), and this difference was significant,
t(470) = -12.9, p < .0001, d = -1.66. Approximately 3% of humans and 7.5% of PSS
model players had no choice variance, which means they made the same choice every
round regardless other player’s choice. Humans also had higher average player distance
from the minimum (M = 1.32, SD = .96) than the models (M = .92, SD = .65), which was
significant, t(470) = 4.37, p < .0001, d = -0.56. This is another piece of evidence
suggesting PSS model “players” were more efficient at coordinating in groups. To better
understand why, effort and payoffs (Figure 35), as well as strategy utilities (Figure 36)
for all PSS model “players” are explored for one group.
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Figure 35. Effort (left) and payoffs (right) for each player (i.e., model) in the example
group across 20 rounds.
In the first round, player 2 (i.e., gray line with “x” marker) sets the minimum (i.e.,
3), and all other players choose higher (left in Figure 35). Player 3 (i.e., black dotted line
with diamond marker) then sets the minimum between rounds 2 and 13, then appears to
switch strategies at round 14 by choosing the highest effort of the group. At this same
time, player 2 becomes the new minimum setter after a slightly erratic pattern of choices.
This pattern of minimum setting is easier to see by looking at payoffs (right in Figure 35),
because the minimum setter has the highest payoff in a given round. Behavior of player 2
and 3 is better understood by looking at strategy utility changes over time (Figure 36). In
this group, player 3 is the only risk dominant player-type as all other players are payoff
dominant. Between rounds 2 and 13, player 3 sets the minimum and earns the highest
payoff. However, during this time, the utility of the minimum strategy gradually declines
while the signal strategy gradually increases. The minimum strategy starts out with a
utility of 130 and between rounds 2 and 13, the average payoff earned was about 95. This
decline is explained by the utility learning equation, which adds the difference between
the new payoff and previous utility (e.g., 95 – 130 = -35) weighted by the learning rate
(e.g., .2 * -35 = -7) to the previous utility (e.g., 130 + -7 = 123).
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Figure 36. Strategy utilities for each player (i.e., model) in the example group across 20
rounds. The starting utilities for strategies are shown at round 0.
As long as the payoff is less than the previous utility value, the utility will
continue to decrease. The signal strategy starts off with a utility of 36 and between rounds
2 and 13, the average forgone payoff is approximately 106 (i.e., 80 after counterfactual
payoff weighting). Therefore, the increase in utility for the signal strategy is due to the
difference between the new payoff and previous utility (e.g., 80 – 36 = 44) weighted by
the learning rate (e.g., .2 * 44 = 8.8) added to the previous utility value for the signal
strategy (e.g., 36 + 8.8 = 44.8). At round 14, player 3 switched from minimum to the
signal strategy and chose 6 and paid a cost as the minimum was 4 that round. Player 3
received a payoff of 80, which was applied to the signal strategy, and a forgone payoff of
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100 for the minimum strategy. This resulted in the minimum strategy becoming dominant
again for player 3. On the other hand, player 2 is payoff dominant and starts out using the
signal and average strategies. After paying the cost of choosing higher than the minimum
several times during the first 13 rounds, the minimum strategy becomes dominant for the
remainder of the game. Interestingly, the payoff dominant players were able to influence
the risk dominant player (i.e., player 3) to choose higher and eventually to make the
highest choice in the group. However, it was “too little too late” as the players that chose
strategies leading to higher effort paid a cost and received lower payoffs, and eventually
learned that the minimum or average strategies tend to result in higher payoffs. This trend
towards selecting minimum and average strategies due to learning over time helps
explain why the PSS model has a negative trend in variance over time.
Overall, the PSS model is able to capture average behavior over time, the
relationship between group effort and variance, and to a lesser degree, group dynamics.
Next, the PSS model is compared to the EWA and EEWA models.
Model Comparisons
To properly evaluate the PSS model, it is compared to the EWA and EEWA to
assess whether it can better capture human behavior in the MEG. To allow for an applesto-apples comparison, EWA and EEWA were both implemented in ACT-R. They are
referred to as ACT-R EWA and ACT-R EEWA. Due to the nature of ACT-R models as
process models, in addition to quantitative model comparisons, the models are compared
qualitatively as well. Prior to comparing the PSS, ACT-R EWA, and ACT-R EEWA
models, the EWA and EEWA are compared to their ACT-R implemented counterparts to
ensure they overlap and have a comparable fit to the human data.
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ACT-R Implementations of EWA and EEWA
The choice attractions in the EWA and EEWA models correspond with utility
learning for procedures in ACT-R, which already has equations to handle procedural
memory. Therefore, both ACT-R EWA and EEWA models use only utility learning with
choice rules and only three parameters: utility learning rate, utility noise, and forgone
payoff weight (i.e., delta in EWA).
At the start of each round, a model selects the choice rule with the highest utility
(see Figure 37). After making a choice, the model receives a reward equal to the payoff
earned based on its choice and the minimum choice in the group. Next, the model
simulates the unchosen choice rules to represent counterfactual thinking where the actual
minimum is used to determine the weighted forgone payoff for each choice (excluding
the actual choice). After all player made a choice and simulated forgone choices, the
round is over.

Figure 37. Processes in the ACT-R implementation of the EWA (left) and EEWA (right)
models.
Starting utilities were set between 0 and 2, and corresponded with first round
choice probabilities of humans. This resulted in similar first round choices as humans and
setting them low allowed first round choices to have a strong initial impact on utilities
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just like the EWA model. For the ACT-R EWA model, utility noise was fixed at 1
(default), utility learning rate was a free parameter that was determined to be .1 through
model fitting, and delta was sampled at random for each player and varied between .1 and
.15. Just like the EEWA, the ACT-R EEWA model was extended to include forgone
outcomes for the minimum and other player’s choices as potential minimums. The ACTR EEWA went through the same process as EEWA, but for four sets of simulations for
unchosen choice rules (i.e., one for each players choice). For the ACT-R EEWA, utility
noise was fixed at 2, utility learning rate was fixed at .2 (default), and delta was a
sampled at random for each player and varied between .98 and 1.

Figure 38. Model fits to human average effort and variance for EWA and ACT-R EWA
(left) and EEWA and ACT-R EEWA (right)
The ACT-R EWA fit to the human data (left in Figure 38) for average effort, r(38)
= 0.51, RMSE = 0.82, and variance, r(38) = -0.10, RMSE = 0.49, was comparable to
EWA for average effort, r(38) = 0.52, RMSE = 0.96, and variance, r(38) = -0.10, RMSE =
0.53. However, the ACT-R EEWA fit to the human data (right in Figure 38) for average
effort was not quite as good, r(38) = 0.47, RMSE = 0.42, as EEWA, r(38) = 0.55, RMSE

112

= 0.31. The difference in fit for human variance was even greater, with EEWA fitting
better, r(38) = -0.06, RMSE = 0.42, than ACT-R EEWA, r(38) = -0.19, RMSE = 1.78.
In addition, the relationship between average player variance and distance from
the minimum was explored for each model. There was a significant positive correlation
between average player distance from the minimum and variance for the EWA model,
r(398) = .31, p < .0001, but no correlation for ACT-R EWA, r(398) = -.03, p = .49
(Figure 39). Approximately 40% of all EWA players had no variance (i.e., player
variance of zero in Figure 39) compared to about 70% for ACT-R EWA.
EWA

ACT-R EWA

Figure 39. Scatterplots showing average player distance from the minimum (i.e.,
MinDist) and variance for the EWA (left) and ACT-R EWA (right) models.
This significant amount of choice stickiness is resulting in artificial fits to both
average effort and variance, since only about 3% of humans had no choice variance. The
EWA and ACT-R EWA models are eliminated from the model comparison because of
their failure to capture group dynamics and the artificial fitting of average behavior. Next,
the average player distance from the minimum and variance for EEWA and ACT-R
EEWA are compared (Figure 40).
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EEWA

ACT-R EEWA

Figure 40. Scatterplots showing average player distance from the minimum (i.e.,
MinDist) and variance for the EEWA (left) and ACT-R EEWA (right) models.
There was a significant positive correlation between average player distance from
the minimum and variance for EEWA, r(398) = .15, p = .003, and ACT-R EEWA, r(398)
= .45, p < .0001. Similar to EWA models, there is also evidence for choice stickiness.
Approximately 40% of EEWA players had no choice variance, compared to about 15%
for ACT-R EEWA players. Although the EEWA model was able to fit both the average
effort and variance of humans rather well (right in Figure 38), the large portion of EEWA
“players” with no variance suggests these fits to human behavior are artificial. Therefore,
the EEWA model is eliminated from the model comparison as well. In the following
section, the PSS and ACT-R EEWA models are compared in greater detail.
PSS and ACT-R EEWA
With the exception of average variance, both the PSS and ACT-R EEWA models
are able to capture human behavior relatively well and do not appear to do so artificially.
In this section, the models are compared in greater detail to evaluate which model is
better able to capture human behavior in the MEG.
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Figure 41. Average effort and variance across 20 rounds for human data, PSS model, and
ACT-R EEWA (left) and the relationship between average group effort and variance for
human data, PSS model, and ACT-R EEWA (right).
The PSS model was not penalized for its additional complexity (i.e., the
parameters within the ACT-R architecture and additional added features like player
types) in these comparisons should be considered in the context of model fitting. The PSS
model had a better fit for both average effort, r(38) = .4, RMSE = .27, and variance, r(38)
= -.13, RMSE = 1.6, compared to ACT-R EEWA for effort, r(38) = .46, RMSE = .42, and
variance, r(38) = -.19, RMSE = 1.78 (left in Figure 41).
Next, the relationship between group effort and variance was explored (right in
Figure 41). There was a statistically non-significant, but practically significant negative
relationship between average effort and variance for the human data, r(16) = -.38, p =
.12. However, this negative relationship was significant for the PSS model, r(98) = -.48,
p < .0001, and the ACT-R EEWA, r(98) = -.29, p = .003. Compared to the human data
and PSS model, the ACT-R EEWA groups tended to be more tightly packed around the
mid-point of effort and within an average variance of 2. There is a more detailed
explanation for this pattern of behavior later in this section.
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Figure 42. Average payoff (left) and distance from the minimum (right) across 20 rounds
for humans, PSS model, and ACT-R EEWA model.
To further compare PSS and ACT-R EEWA models, average payoff and distance
from the minimum are explored. For average payoff (left in Figure 42), ACT-R EEWA,
r(38) = .26, RMSE = 8.87 had a slightly better fit to the human data than the PSS model,
r(38) = .34, RMSE = 10.4. However, for average distance from the minimum (right in
Figure 42), the PSS model r(38) = .65, RMSE = 0.5, had a better fit than ACT-R EEWA,
r(38) = .59, RMSE = .58. So far, the PSS model appears to be better able to capture
average behavior and average group behavior, but not by much. Next, the group
dynamics of both models are compared to that of humans.
Human

PSS Model

ACT-R EEWA

Figure 43. Average effort for eight groups of humans (left), PSS models (middle), and
ACT-R EEWA models (right).
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As discussed, the group dynamics of humans involves some dramatic shifts in
average effort over time (left in Figure 43) and although the PSS groups have similar
group dynamics (middle in Figure 43), they lack these dramatic shifts. The ACT-R
EEWA (right in Figure 43) shows some variation in average effort of groups, but its
rather flat compared to humans and PSS groups. For a more quantitative exploration of
group dynamics, average player distance from the minimum and variance are compared
as well (Figure 44).
Human

PSS Model

ACT-R EEWA

Figure 44. Scatterplots showing the relationship between average player distance from
the minimum and variance for humans (left), PSS models (middle), and ACT-R EEWA
models (right).
The relationship between average player distance from the minimum and variance
was weaker for the human data, r(70) = .32, p < .01, compared PSS, r(398) = .54, p <
.0001, and ACT-R EEWA models, r(398) = .45, p < .0001. A one-way ANOVA for
average player variance revealed a significant difference between humans, PSS, and
ACT-R EEWA, F(2,869) = 130.1, p < .0001, η2 = .23, and a Tukey test further revealed
they all differed from each other (p < .03). Average player variance was highest for
humans (M = 2.78, SD = 1.87), followed by PSS (M = 1.01, SD = .85), and ACT-R
EEWA models (M = .83, SD = .78). Furthermore, there were more players with no choice
variance for the ACT-R EEWA model (15%) compared to PSS (7.5%) and humans (3%).
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A one-way ANOVA was also performed for average player distance from the minimum,
which was significant, F(2,869) = 14.33, p < .0001, η2 = .23. Average player distance
from the minimum was highest for humans (M = 1.32, SD = .96), followed by PSS (M =
.92, SD = .65), and ACT-R EEWA models (M = .88, SD = .55). A Tukey test revealed the
models differed from the human data (p < .0001), but not from each other (p > .05)
The ACT-R EEWA model has lower average variance, more choice stickiness,
and flatter average group effort. To better understand why, one ACT-R EEWA group is
explored at the individual level by looking at each player’s choice and payoff (Figure 45),
and choice rule utility profile (Figure 46).

Figure 45. Effort (left) and payoff (right) for each player in one ACT-R EEWA group.
The EEWA model considers the minimum and other player choices as potential
minimums. It only considers what players chose the previous round; therefore, it tends to
“focus” on the average group choice. In the example group, ACT-R EEWA “players”
choices vary between 2 and 7 for the first round followed by convergence toward 4,
which becomes the average at the end of the fourth round (Figure 45). By round 12, there
is pure coordination at 4, which is quite different from behavior of humans and the PSS
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model. This type of behavior helps explains why the ACT-R EEWA model has rather flat
average group effort, and player variance and distance from the minimum are low.
Due to the design of ACT-R EEWA, choice attractions for “players” are highest
for initial choices and quickly change so that the average choice is most attractive. In
Figure 46, choice attractions are shown for ACT-R EEWA model “players”. There is
little variation in choice rule utilities (i.e., attractions). For “Players” 1 and 2, choice rule
4 becomes dominant by round 3. For “players” 3 and 4, they start with higher utilities for
choices below 4, until around round 10, where the choice of 4 becomes dominant.

Figure 46. Choice rule utility profiles for all four players (from left to right).
These model comparisons reveal that overall, the PSS model is able to capture
average behavior, average group behavior, and group dynamics of human behavior better
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than the ACT-R EEWA model. In some cases, the ACT-R EEWA model performs nearly
as well (i.e., average variance and distance from the minimum) and in one case better
than the PSS model (i.e., average payoff). However, after a more detailed look at the
ACT-R EEWA model group dynamics, it is clearer that its behavior is rather artificial. As
mentioned, the PSS model was not penalized for additional complexity, which may have
contributed to its better fit to the human data. One last thing to compare is
correspondance to human cognition and game theory. The PSS model was developed to
align with cognitive processes and includes features from game theory (i.e., player types,
simple strategies, signaling, and beliefs about other players) and counterfactual thinking.
The player types in the PSS model come directly from van Huyck et al.’s (1990,
1991) conclusion that players start the game using payoff dominant and risk dominant
strategies and begin to deviate from this strategy as they learn. The simple strategies used
in the PSS are based on previous research indicating that more complex strategies are
often aversive or costly (Beard & Beil, 1994; Duffy & Nagel, 1997; Ho et al., 1998;
McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Nagel, 1995; Rubinstein, 1989; Schotter et al., 1994; van
Huyck et al., 2002) and since it’s difficult to predict behavior of other players, simple
strategies can be more efficient (Camerer, 2003; Haruvy & Stahl, 2007; Ho & Weigelt,
1996). A signaling strategy was included since players often attempt to signal in an
attempt to influence other players and receive a higher payoff, however, since there is a
cost to signaling (Thompson & Kaufman, 2010), it only continues if it is effective
(Charness et al., 2018). In the PSS model, signaling behavior is possible and may
continue until the cost (i.e., reduction in payoffs) overweighs the benefits (i.e., potential
higher future payoffs). The PSS model uses player choice predictions because players are
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strongly affected by other player’s choices (Brandts et al., 2014, 2015) and tend to use
their counterpart’s previous behavior to predict what they might do in the future in order
to best respond (Camerer, 2003). Lastly, the PSS model weights payoffs for unchosen
strategies (i.e., counterfactuals) 75% as much as actual payoffs for correspondence with
counterfactual thinking (Byrne, 2016; Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and the idea that it is
treated differently than actual outcomes (Camerer & Ho, 1999).
The EEWA model does not have the previously described capabilities that
correspond to cognitive processes in humans. The ACT-R EEWA does have improved
cognitive plausibility and correspondence to human behavior (e.g., less sticky choices
and better group dynamics) over the EEWA. However, in order to fit human behavior,
the forgone payoff weight (i.e., delta) was set to vary between .98 and 1. This means that
the payoffs for forgone choices are basically weighted the same as actual payoffs.
However, if it was set lower, the model “players” would have even lower choice variance
and coordination, which means that it would not be able to capture human behavior well.
In addition, the ACT-R EEWA engages in a significant amount of counterfactual
thinking to approximate human behavior. After the actual payoff is received, the model
considers the forgone payoff for all possible choices and each player’s choice as a
potential minimum. This means the model calculates four sets of choice utilities (i.e.,
attractions) for each possible choice, for a total of 28 choice utility updates per round. For
comparison, the PSS model updates the utility of all four strategies once per round
including the chosen strategy. Lastly, ACT-R EEWA players are not capable of signaling
and if a “player” chooses a high level of effort, it would be due to the first-round choice
or a delayed reaction to one or more player choosing higher for a few rounds.
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Discussion
The PSS model includes player types, simple strategies, player choice predictions,
and an improved capability to signal. It is able to fit average behavior and average group
behavior of humans in the MEG reasonably well. The model is also able to approximate
group dynamics, but to a lesser degree. It is better at coordinating than humans, which
results in a stronger decline in variance over time. Model comparisons show that the PSS
model is more successful than competing models in capturing the overall behavior of
humans and better corresponds to psychological processes and concepts from game
theory and counterfactual thinking. The EWA, ACT-R EWA, and EEWA models
appeared to have an artificial fit to human behavior due to the large number of players
that had no choice variance (i.e., 40% or greater). Although the ACT-R EEWA was better
than the other models, compared to the PSS model, it had a larger number of players with
no choice variance (i.e., 15% compared to 7.5%), was not able to capture the human
behavior as well, and lacked psychological correspondence to human behavior and
previous literature. Although the PSS model was an improvement over the ACT-R
EEWA, there are some opportunities for future work to further improve the model.
Future work with the PSS model could improve: 1) player choice predictions, 2)
player types and strategies 3) sensitivity to the counterfactual manipulation, and 4)
realistic signaling. The player choice predictions in the PSS model are rather basic. They
use instances, specifically, the change from one round to another, to predict what players
are going to do next. Choice predictions are based on instances, which do not vary much
between “players” beyond the first round where the first generated instance includes
starting choice predictions based on the first-round choice probability of humans. This is
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because instances after the first round contain actual choices of all players. Ideally, each
model “player” would include predictions about player types in combination with the
player choice predictions already included here. Another potential method is including
aspects of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) into the PSS model,
which has previously been implemented in ACT-R, specifically ACT-R embodied
(Trafton et al., 2013). This could involve the capability to make inferences about what
others are attending to, are aware of, and might do next. In the context of the MEG, these
capabilities could be useful. However, most theory of mind models involve more
interaction with humans rather than just interacting solely through choices during a game.
There were two player types and four strategies included in the PSS model. The
two player types were described in the literature and the strategies were based loosely on
the literature and comments by participants. PSS model fitting suggested there is a
slightly higher frequency of payoff dominant player types (57%). However, there is likely
more than just two player types and four strategies. Ideally, an experiment would be run
to directly address player types and strategies to better inform this decision, rather than
doing so arbitrarily. In addition, some existing datasets (e.g., Leng et al., 2018, van
Huyck et al., 1990, 1991) could be used to infer strategies and player types using
Bayesian inference to provide converging evidence.
The PSS model does not include the counterfactual manipulation. There is
evidence that counterfactuals influenced humans, however, there is also evidence that
few used them (35%) and used them consistently throughout the experiment (Hough,
O’Neill, & Juvina, 2021). A counterfactual generation parameter on a continuum between
0 and 1 could be used to represent the presentation and use of counterfactuals. At zero the

123

“player” generates downward counterfactuals, in the middle it generates bidirectional
counterfactuals, and at 1, it generates upward counterfactuals. These generated
counterfactuals could simulate outcomes where the other players had chosen lower
(downward) or higher (upward). To allow for change over time based on the context, the
value of this parameter could be influenced by payoffs so that it can move along the
continuum. For instance, a player in the downward condition would start out generating
downward counterfactuals. If they were to earn higher payoffs than expected based on
those counterfactuals, the value of the parameter would increase and the player would
shift towards generating bidirectional counterfactuals. These counterfactuals could
directly affect strategy utilities or generate “counterfactual” instances to influence player
choice predictions. Adding such a parameter would increase complexity and have to be
incorporated with strategies, player choice predictions, and instances. However, it is
possible that strategies might not be necessary with the counterfactual generation
parameter, as it can represent risk and payoff dominant behavior by considering if players
were to choose lower or higher in subsequent rounds.
Lastly, the PSS model “players” have the capability to signal, however, it is very
constrained. The counterfactual generation parameter could give rise to signaling. When
at the high end of the continuum, a player would be more likely to signal or choose
higher as it would be “optimistic” and believe other players will start choosing higher or
in response to their behavior. Another alternative is formulating a cost/reward function
that allows for individual differences in the value of costs and rewards associated with
signaling or choosing higher than other players. This function could result in a shift to or
away from signaling depending on the starting values and the group context.
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V.

General Discussion

Summary of Findings
There were four goals of this dissertation: 1) better understand coordination
behavior in a simulated coordination situation, 2) assess if and how counterfactual nudges
can improve coordination efficiency, 3) explore if and how individual traits, motivations,
and signaling behavior affect group dynamics, and 4) develop a new model to
approximate human behavior in the MEG and the corresponding psychological processes.
Summaries for the two experiments and model development are presented below.
In the first experiment, there were four main findings. First, coordination was
more efficient and stable compared to previous MEG experiments (e.g., van Huyck et al.
1990). These results were attributed to counterfactuals, as previous research with
complete outcome information (Camerer & Ho, 1998; van Huyck et al., 1990) and small
groups sizes (Leng et al., 2018; van Huyck et al. 1990) found little improvement of
coordination efficiency and stability over base conditions (e.g., minimum only and larger
groups of 16). Second, there was little to no evidence that cognitive effort avoidance and
individual traits relate to coordination behavior. However, there was an unexpected taskorder effect where participants who completed the Demand Selection Task (i.e., DST)
first appeared to have greater difficulty coordinating (e.g., lower average effort and
higher variance), compared to participants who completed the REMEG first. This finding
also suggested that the real effort task did not increase coordination efficiency and if
anything, may have reduced it. Third, there was no difference in coordination efficiency
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between human and bot conditions, however, bot conditions had lower variance
due to better coordination. Lastly, the EEWA model better fit the data compared to the
EWA model that only considered the minimum. This provided some additional evidence
that players consider what could have happened beyond changing their own choices.
The second experiment served as a follow up to explore and assess the potential
effects of different types of counterfactuals by including upward, bidirectional,
downward, and control (no counterfactuals) conditions. In all conditions, one human
received the counterfactual manipulation and played the game with three EEWA bots
(modified after first experiment) that did not receive the manipulation and had access to
all player choices. There were three main findings. First, about two thirds of the
participants failed the manipulation check, which suggested many were not paying
attention or the manipulation was not clear (e.g., too much information). Second, despite
only humans receiving the manipulation, which potentially weakened its effects, there
were differences in effort between the upward and downward conditions. Lastly, there
were differences between humans and bots for effort, payoffs, and signaling. Agents had
higher effort and humans had higher payoffs. The differences in signaling were
particularly interesting. Signaling is effective if it encourages other players to choose
higher effort and results in higher payoffs over time. Players typically stop signaling once
it becomes ineffective (e.g., Charness et al., 2018). However, more bots were classified as
signalers (62%), they had lower payoffs, and there was no difference in effort compared
to non-signalers. This suggests that the signaling-like behavior of bots was artificial and
often maladaptive. For humans, there were less signalers (39%) and they had higher
effort and payoffs than non-signalers. Overall, there was evidence that one human player
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receiving upward counterfactuals or engaging in signaling behavior can nudge bot
players in a group towards more efficient coordination.
The PSS model was developed to correspond to game theory, counterfactual
thinking, and psychological processes of humans. It has player types, choice strategies,
counterpart predictions, and some signaling capabilities. The model was able to capture
average and group behavior of humans in the MEG better than competing models. All
models struggled to capture elements of group dynamics. Three of the four competing
models (i.e., EWA, ACT-R EWA, and EEWA) artificially fit average human behavior
due to the large number of players without choice variance (40% or higher). The ACT-R
EEWA had fewer no variance players (15%), but the PSS model had half that amount
(7.5%), which was closer to amount observed in the human data (3%). Both the ACT-R
EEWA and PSS model had better coordination than humans. However, the PSS model
had more realistic group dynamics, better corresponded to the literature, and had more
cognitive plausibility than the ACT-R EEWA.
In summary, the two experiments and modeling work addressed the goals of this
dissertation. First, coordination behavior in the MEG involves individual predispositions
and interactions between players within a group, however, group dynamics have more
influence. Second, both experiments provided evidence that counterfactuals, specifically,
upward can nudge players towards choosing higher effort and influence the group to do
the same. Third, there was no evidence that effort avoidance or individual traits influence
behavior after the first round, however, there was evidence that the signaling behavior of
one player (i.e., human) can nudge other players (i.e., bots) and increase coordination
efficiency. Therefore, it appears that both information and behavior can serve as nudges
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for players. Lastly, the PSS model was able to fit human behavior at the average and
average group levels, and to a lesser extent, the individual level and group dynamics over
time. In addition, the model had clear correspondence to game theory, counterfactual
thinking, and approximated psychological processes.
Contributions
This dissertation made several contributions to the game theory literature.
Previous experiments primarily used average effort and minimum effort to make
inferences about coordination, coordination efficiency, and signaling behavior. In this
dissertation, I analyzed behavior at average, group, and individual levels and introduced
several new methods to analyze behavior. Previous work used the minimum effort to
measure coordination (e.g., Leng et al., 2018; van Huyck et al., 1990), which leaves out
other player choices and does not assess whether the minimum was much lower than
other player’s choices. In this dissertation, I used several metrics: average intergroup
variance, the relationship between group effort and variance, and average distance from
the minimum. However, the minimum is important and has been used to identify weak
links for further analysis (e.g., Bortolotti et al., 2016). Here, I extended the weak link
analysis by using distance from the minimum to rank players from weak links to strong
links. This analysis revealed weak links were not consistently the weak links, but did
influence other players particularly in the beginning of the game. This suggests that weak
links players have a predisposition to choose lower effort and aligns with results from the
first experiment where effort-related traits were more related to first round choices.
Signaling is often discussed in coordination (e.g., Brandts et al., 2014, 2015;
Charness et al., 2018), but there is no clear method to measure or identify it in the MEG.
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Leng et al. (2018) operationalized signaling as alternating between the minimum and
higher effort. However, effective signaling involves paying a cost, other players need to
be aware of that cost, and it needs to persist long enough to influence other players
(Brandts et al., 2014, 2015). Alternating between the minimum and higher effort would
not be effective and is not enough evidence to label a player as a signaler. Here, I used
distance from the minimum to measure signaling and its extent, and identified signalers
as those players who had distance from the minimum above zero for five consecutive
rounds. This method is better aligned with the literature and those identified as signalers
showed the expected pattern of effective signaling: short-term costs (i.e., lower payoffs
by choosing higher than the minimum) followed by long-term benefits (i.e., higher
payoffs as the minimum increases).
Previous research in coordination games has applied various methods for
increasing coordination efficiency with varying degrees of cost, effort, and effectiveness
(Cooper et al., 1990; Sahin, Eckel, & Komai, 2015; Weber, 2001; van Huyck et al., 1990;
van Huyck, Gillette, & Battalio, 1992; van Huyck, Battalio, & Beil, 1993). In some cases,
the intervention actually backfired if did not persist long enough (Brandts et al., 2014,
2015). Here, I used counterfactuals to give players information about how outcomes
could have been different if they made different choices or the minimum was different.
Research highlighted the lack of a coordination device or salient focal point as the cause
of coordination failure (Blume et al., 1998; Mehta et al., 1994). The provided
counterfactuals provided additional focal points and players knew that everyone in the
group received them. This did not require changes to the game structure and did not relay
on other players to communicate or help others. It reduced the effort required to consider
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different outcomes, was tailored to each participant, and was provided consistently.
Upward and downward counterfactuals influenced coordination efficiency, even when
only one player in the group received them.
In this dissertation, a cognitive model of the MEG was developed within the
ACT-R cognitive architecture. Prior to this dissertation, the mathematical EWA model
was the only model that was used to explain and fit data for the MEG. It has some traits
with some psychological correspondence and has the potential to fit data after estimating
parameters. The PSS model included behavioral features described in the literature and
the parameter estimations were cognitively plausible. The model can be inspected and
evaluated at the process level, which is more informative about the nature of cognitive
processes, strategies, and the interaction between different cognitive mechanisms. For
instance, in the earlier discussion regarding Figure 35, a PSS model player switched
strategies over time and this behavior was traced back to how the utility of that strategy
changed over time due to learning and pregame preferences.
Limitations and Future Work
There is potential for future work to address limitations with measurements, the
influence of counterfactuals, how player types and strategies evolve over time, and
insight into how players react to counterparts. There were a lot of exploratory analyzes
for the first experiment to assess coordination, coordination efficiency, and signaling. The
second experiment extended these analyses to identify signalers. However, more work is
needed to find and assess better assess methods of measurements for coordination related
behaviors. Intergroup variance and the relationship between group effort and variance
were used to assess coordination. However, variance is not normally distributed and
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poses a potential problem for parametric statistical tests. Effort was the primary metric
used in this dissertation to measure coordination efficiency. Realizing its limitation, I
analyzed behavior at different levels of analysis: average, group, and individual to better
measure coordination efficiency. It is still not clear which method is most appropriate to
measure coordination efficiency.
The second experiment extended the counterfactual manipulation by including
several conditions to assess how counterfactual direction influences coordination
efficiency. However, using groups comprised of one human and artificial bots limits
generalizability to groups of humans. Also, only the human received the counterfactual
manipulation and bots received more information than humans in the control condition.
The same bots were used in all conditions because there was no clear evidence about how
counterfactuals influence behavior in the MEG and therefore, no clear guidance on how
the bots should respond to them. A future experiment could address the effectiveness of
the counterfactual manipulation and assess the degree that they are used when all players
receive them and have access to the same information. Ideally, this experiment would use
all human groups. I predict that the counterfactual manipulations would have a stronger
effect on coordination behavior for human groups where all humans receive the
manipulation.
Another issue was the manipulation check, it is not clear how many participants
used counterfactuals as 70% failed the manipulation check and less than half indicated
whether they used them. Some exploration is needed to assess the best way to present
counterfactuals, how to properly assess if participants pay attention to them, and whether
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participants used them. This would be valuable to assess in a pilot study prior to running
an experiment with a counterfactual manipulation in the MEG or related game.
In addition to the counterfactual manipulation, beliefs about other players, player
types, strategies, and group dynamics could be further explored. This could involve using
the methods from the second experiment to gather process level data from the human
participant to better understand player types, choice strategies, signaling, attention
allocation, and how group dynamics influence behavioral changes. For instance, in
addition to outcome measures, players could give verbal reports or short descriptions
with a structured format in real time, and their attention could be tracked using either eye
or mouse tracking. Using available literature and Bayesian inference, some of these
implicit qualities could be inferred using these multiple sources of behavior. This process
data and inferences could better inform and validate the PSS model.

132

References
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Anderson, J. R. (2007). How can the human mind occur in the physical universe?. New
York: NY: Oxford University Press
Anderson, J. R., & Lebiere, C. (1998). The atomic components of thought. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory
of mind”?. Cognition, 21(1), 37-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)900228
Barr, N., Pennycook, G., Stolz, J. A., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015). Reasoned connections:
A dual-process perspective on creative thought. Thinking & Reasoning, 21(1), 6175. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2014.895915
Bautista, L. M., Tinbergen, J., & Kacelnik, A. (2001). To walk or to fly? How birds
choose among foraging modes. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 98(3), 1089-1094. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.98.3.1089
Beard, T. R., & Beil, R. O. (1994). Do people rely on the self-interested maximization of
others? An experimental test. Management Science, 40(2), 252–262.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.2.252
Berninghaus, S. K., & Ehrhart, K.-M. (1998). Time horizon and equilibrium selection in
tacit coordination games: Experimental results. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 37(2), 231–248. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00086-9
133

Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y. G., & Sprinkle, G. B. (1998). Experimental evidence
on the evolution of meaning of messages in sender-receiver games. The American
Economic Review, 88(5), 1323–1340. https://www.jstor.org/stable/116874
Bortolotti, S., Devetag, G., & Ortmann, A. (2016). Group incentives or individual
incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology,
56, 60-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.004
Bosworth, S. J. (2013). Social capital and equilibrium selection in Stag Hunt
games. Journal of economic psychology, 39, 11-20.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.06.004
Brandts, J., & Cooper, D. J. (2006). A change would do you good . . .. an experimental
study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations. American
Economic Review, 96(3), 669–693. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.669
Brandts, J., Cooper, D. J., & Weber, R. A. (2014). Legitimacy, communication, and
leadership in the turnaround game. Management Science, 61(11), 2627–2645.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2021
Brandts, J., Cooper, D. J., Fatas, E., & Qi, S. (2015). Stand by me—experiments on help
and commitment in coordination games. Management Science, 62(10), 2916–
2936. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2269
Byrne, R. M. (2016). Counterfactual thought. Annual Review of Psychology, 67(1), 135–
157. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249
Cachon, G. P., & Camerer, C. F. (1996). Loss-avoidance and forward induction in
experimental coordination games. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1),
165–194. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946661

134

Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 42(1), 116–131. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.42.1.116
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Camerer, C., & Ho, T. H. (1998). Experience-weighted attraction learning in coordination
games: Probability rules, heterogeneity, and time-variation. Journal of
Mathematical Psychology, 42(2–3), 305–326.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1998.1217
Camerer, C., & Ho, T. H. (1999). Experience‐weighted attraction learning in normal form
games. Econometrica, 67(4), 827-874. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00054
Charness, G., Gneezy, U., & Henderson, A. (2018). Experimental methods: Measuring
effort ineconomics experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
149, 74–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.024
Charnov, E. L. (1976). Optimal foraging: The marginal value theorem. Theoretical
Population Biology, 9(2), 129-136. https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(76)90040X
Chaudhuri, A., Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2009). Talking ourselves to efficiency:
Coordination in intergenerational minimum effort games with private, almost
common and common knowledge of advice. The Economic Journal, 119(534),
91–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02207.x
Chen, D. L., Schonger, M., & Wickens, C. (2016). oTree—An open-source platform for
laboratory, online, and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Finance, 9, 88-97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001

135

Chen, Z., Mo, L., & Honomichl, R. (2004). Having the memory of an elephant: long-term
retrieval and the use of analogues in problem solving. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 133(3), 415-433. https://doi.org/10.1037/00963445.133.3.415
Collins, M. G., Hough, A. R., O’Neil, K., & Juvina, I. (2019). Modeling between and
within group dynamics in the minimum effort game. Unpublished Manuscript.
Collins, M. G., Juvina, I., & Gluck, K. A. (2016). Cognitive model of trust dynamics
predicts human behavior within and between two games of strategic interaction
with computerized confederate bots. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 49.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00049
Cooper, D. J., & Van Huyck, J. (2018). Coordination and transfer. Experimental
Economics, 21(3), 487–512. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9521-8
Cooper, R. W., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W. (1990). Selection criteria in
coordination games: Some experimental results. The American Economic Review,
80(1), 218–233. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2006744
Cooper, R., De Jong, D., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. (1992). Communication in
coordination games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 739–771.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2118488
Cooper, R., DeJong, D. V., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. W. (1994). Alternative institutions
for resolving coordination problems: Experimental evidence on forward induction
and preplay communication. In J. W. Friedman (Ed.), Problems of coordination in
economic activity (pp. 129–146). Springer.

136

Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all?
Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty.
Cognition, 58(1), 1-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(95)00664-8
Costa-Gomes, M. A., Crawford, V. P., & Iriberri, N. (2009). Comparing models of
strategic thinking in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s coordination games. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 7(2–3), 365–376.
https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.2-3.365
Devetag, G. (2005). Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment. Economics
Letters, 89(2), 227-232. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.038
Devetag, G., & Ortmann, A. (2007). When and why? A critical survey on coordination
failure in the laboratory. Experimental Economics, 10(3), 331–344.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9178-9
Dornic, S., Ekehammar, B., & Laaksonen, T. (1991). Tolerance for mental effort: Selfratings related to perception, performance and personality. Personality and
Individual Differences, 12(3), 313-319. https://doi.org/10.1016/01918869(91)90118-U
Duckworth, A. L., & Seligman, M. E. (2005). Self-discipline outdoes instruction quiz in
predicting academic performance of adolescents. Psychological science, 16(12),
939-944. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01641.x
Duffy, J., & Nagel, R. (1997). On the robustness of behaviour in experimental ‘beauty
contest’games. The Economic Journal, 107(445), 1684–1700.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00075.x

137

Dyczewski, E. A., & Markman, K. D. (2012). General attainability beliefs moderate the
motivational effects of counterfactual thinking. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 48(5), 1217–1220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.04.016 905
Ekkekakis, P., Hall, E. E., & Petruzzello, S. J. (2005). Some like it vigorous: Measuring
individual differences in the preference for and tolerance of exercise
intensity. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 27(3), 350-374.
https://doi.org/10.1123/jsep.27.3.350
Engelmann, D., & Normann, H. T. (2010). Maximum effort in the minimum-effort
game. Experimental Economics, 13(3), 249-259. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683010-9239-3.
Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12(2), 168–192.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868308316091
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses
using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior
Research Methods, 41(4), 1149–1160. https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149
910
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical
sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 39(2), 175–191.
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146

138

Ferrante, D., Girotto, V., Stragà, M., & Walsh, C. (2013). Improving the past and the
future: A temporal asymmetry in hypothetical thinking. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 142(1), 23. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027947
Florack, A., Keller, J., & Palcu, J. (2013). Regulatory focus in economic contexts.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 38, 127–137.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.06.001
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19(4), 25-42. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O'donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time
preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 351-401.
https://doi.org/ 10.1257/002205102320161311
Galinksy, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Counterfactuals as behavior primes:
Priming the simulation heuristic and consideration of alternatives. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 36(4), 257–383.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1999.1409
Galinksy, A. D., Moskowitz, G. B., & Skurnik, I. (2000). Counterfactuals as selfgenerated primes: The effect of prior counterfactual activation on person
perception judgments. Social Cognition, 18(3), 252–280.
https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2000.18.3.252
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009). Homo heuristicus: Why biased minds make better
inferences. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(1), 107-143.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x

139

Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of
Psychology, 62, 451-482. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
Gilovich, T. (1983). Biased evaluation and persistence in gambling. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 44(6), 1110. https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.44.6.1110
Girotto, V., Ferrante, D., Pighin, S., & Gonzalez, M. (2007). Postdecisional
counterfactual thinking by actors and readers. Psychological Science, 18(6), 510515. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01931.x
Girotto, V., Legrenzi, P., & Rizzo, A. (1991). Counterfactual thinking: The role of events
controllability. Acta Psychologica, 78(1-3), 111-33. https://doi.org/10.1016/00016918(91)90007-M
Gneezy, U., & List, J. A. (2006). Putting behavioral economics to work: Testing for gift
exchange in labor markets using field experiments. Econometrica, 74(5), 13651384. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00707.x
Gonzalez, C., Lerch, J. F., & Lebiere, C. (2003). Instance‐based learning in dynamic
decision making. Cognitive Science, 27(4), 591-635.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2704_2
Haruvy, E., & Stahl, D. O. (2007). Equilibrium selection and bounded rationality in
symmetric normal-form games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
62(1), 98–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.002
Ho, T. H., & Weigelt, K. (1996). Task complexity, equilibrium selection, and learning:
An experimental study. Management Science, 42(5), 659–679.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.5.659

140

Ho, T. H., Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K. (1998). Iterated dominance and iterated best
response in experimental” p-beauty contests”. The American Economic Review,
88(4), 947–969. https://www.jstor.org/stable/117013
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic
Review, 92(5), 1644-1655. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282802762024700
Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior: an introduction to behavior theory. Oxford,
England: Appleton-Century.
Hur, T. (2001). The role of regulatory focus in activation of counterfactual thinking.
Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, 15, 159–171.
Jackson, J. J., Wood, D., Bogg, T., Walton, K. E., Harms, P. D., & Roberts, B. W.
(2010). What do conscientious people do? development and validation of the
Behavioral Indicators of Conscientiousness (BIC). Journal of Research in
Personality, 44(4), 501-511.
Jackson, J. J., Wood, D., Bogg, T., Walton, K. E., Harms, P. D., & Roberts, B. W.
(2010). What do conscientious people do? development and validation of the
Behavioral Indicators of Conscientiousness (BIC). Journal of Research in
Personality, 44(4), 501-511. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2010.06.005
Juvina, I., Lebiere, C., & Gonzalez, C. (2015). Modeling trust dynamics in strategic
interaction. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4(3), 197211. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.004
Juvina, I., Nador, J., Larue, O., Green, R., Harel, A., & Minnery, B. (2018). Measuring
individual differences in cognitive effort avoidance. In Proceedings of the 40th
Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Madison, WI.

141

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its
alternatives. Psychological Review, 93(2), 136. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033295X.93.2.136
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-292.
https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814417358_0006
Kimbrough, S. O. (2005, May). Foraging for trust: Exploring rationality and the stag hunt
game. In International Conference on Trust Management (pp. 1-16). Springer,
Berlin, Heidelberg.
Kool, W., & Botvinick, M. (2014). A labor/leisure tradeoff in cognitive control. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(1), 131-141.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031048
Kool, W., McGuire, J. T., Rosen, Z. B., & Botvinick, M. M. (2010). Decision making and
the avoidance of cognitive demand. Journal of Experimental Psychology.
General, 139(4), 665-682. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020198
Kray, L. J., & Galinsky, A. D. (2003). The debiasing effect of counterfactual mind-set:
Increasing the search for disconfirmatory information in group decisions.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91(1), 69–81.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00534-4

142

Krueger, C., & Tian, L. (2004). A comparison of the general linear mixed model and
repeated measures ANOVA using a dataset with multiple missing data points.
Biological Research for Nursing, 6(2), 151–157.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1099800404267682
Kurzban, R., Duckworth, A., Kable, J. W., & Myers, J. (2013). An opportunity cost
model of subjective effort and task performance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
36(6), 661-679. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12003196
Lebiere, C. (1999). Blending: An ACT-R mechanism for aggregate retrievals.
In Proceedings of the Sixth Annual ACT-R Workshop, George Mason University,
Fairfax, VA, USA.
Leng, A., Friesen, L., Kalayci, K., & Man, P. (2018). A minimum effort coordination
game experiment in continuous time. Experimental Economics, 21(3), 549–572.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9550-3
Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. (2002). Reflection and
reflexion: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. In
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology: Vol. 34 (pp. 199249). New York: Academic Press.
Luce, R. D. (1956). Semiorders and a theory of utility discrimination. Econometrica,
Journal of the Econometric Society, 24(2) 178-191.
Malone, T. W., & Crowston, K. (1994). The interdisciplinary study of coordination. ACM
Computing Surveys (CSUR), 26(1), 87–119.
https://doi.org/10.1145/174666.174668

143

Mandel, D. R., & Lehman, D. R. (1996). Counterfactual thinking and ascriptions of cause
and preventability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(3), 450-463.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.450
Markman, K. D., & McMullen, M. N. (2003). A reflection and evaluation model of
comparative thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7(3), 244–267.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0703_04
Markman, K. D., Gavanski, I., Sherman, S. J., & McMullen, M. N. (1993). The mental
simulation of better and worse possible worlds. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 29(1), 87–109. https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1993.1005
Markman, K. D., McMullen, M. N., & Elizaga, R. A. (2008). Counterfactual thinking,
persistence, and performance: A test of the reflection and evaluation model.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(2), 421–428.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.01.001
Markman, K. D., Mizoguchi, N., & McMullen, M. N. (2008). “It would have been worse
under Saddam:” Implications of counterfactual thinking for beliefs regarding the
ethical treatment of prisoners of war. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 44(3), 650-654. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.03.005
Mata, A., Ferreira, M. B., & Sherman, S. J. (2013). The metacognitive advantage of
deliberative thinkers: A dual-process perspective on overconfidence. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 105, 353. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033640
McCloy, R., & Byrne, R. M. (2000). Counterfactual thinking about controllable
events. Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 1071-1078.
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03209355

144

McEleney, A., & Byrne, R. M. (2006). Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal
explanations. Thinking & Reasoning, 12(2), 235-255.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546780500317897
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1992). An experimental study of the centipede game.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 60(4), 803–836.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2951567
Mehta, J., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1994). The nature of salience: An experimental
investigation of pure coordination games. The American Economic Review, 84(3),
658–673. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118074
Mercier, H., Rolison, J. J., Stragà, M., Ferrante, D., Walsh, C. R., & Girotto, V. (2017).
Questioning the preparatory function of counterfactual thinking. Memory &
Cognition, 45(2), 261-269. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0660-5
Morris, M. W., & Moore, P. C. (2000). The lessons we (don't) learn: Counterfactual
thinking and organizational accountability after a close call. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 45(4), 737-765. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667018
Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. The American
Economic Review, 85(5), 1313–1326. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2950991
Nasco, S. A., & Marsh, K. L. (1999). Gaining control through counterfactual thinking.
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(5), 556–568.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167299025005002
Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of mathematics, 54(2), 286-295.
Offerman, T. (2002). Hurting hurts more than helping helps. European Economic Review,
46(8), 1423–1437. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00176-3

145

Pighin, S., Byrne, R. M., Ferrante, D., Gonzalez, M., & Girotto, V. (2011).
Counterfactual thoughts about experienced, observed, and narrated
events. Thinking & Reasoning, 17(2), 197-211.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2011.561598
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and calculated
greed. Nature, 489(7416), 427-430. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature11467
Rand, D. G., Newman, G. E., & Wurzbacher, O. M. (2015). Social context and the
dynamics of cooperative choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(2),
159-166. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1837
Rand, D. G., Peysakhovich, A., Kraft-Todd, G. T., Newman, G. E., Wurzbacher, O.,
Nowak, M. A., & Greene, J. D. (2014). Social heuristics shape intuitive
cooperation. Nature Communications, 5, 3677.
https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms4677
Riechmann, T., & Weimann, J. (2008). Competition as a coordination device:
Experimental evidence from a minimum effort coordination game. European
Journal of Political Economy, 24(2), 437–454.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.09.004
Rim, S., & Summerville, A. (2014). How far to the road not taken? The effect of
psychological distance on counterfactual direction. Personality & Social
Psychology Bulletin, 40(3), 391–401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213513304
Roese, N. J. (1994). The functional basis of counterfactual thinking. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 805–818. https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.66.5.805

146

Roese, N. J. (1997). Counterfactual thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121(1), 133–
148. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.121.1.133
Roese, N. J., & Epstude, K. (2017). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking:
New evidence, new challenges, new insights. In J. M. Olson (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 56, pp. 1–79). Academic Press.
Roese, N. J., & Hur, T. (1997). Affective determinants in counterfactual thinking. Social
Cognition, 15(4), 274–290. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1997.15.4.274
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1995). Outcome controllability and counterfactual
thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(6), 620-628.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167295216008
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1997). Counterfactual thinking: The intersection of affect
and function. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology:
Vol. 29 (pp. 1-59). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1997). Counterfactual thinking: The intersection of affect
and function. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 29, pp. 1–59). Academic Press.
Roese, N. J., Hur, T., & Pennington, G. L. (1999). Counterfactual thinking and regulatory
focus: Implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency versus necessity.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1109-1120.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1109
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the
attribution process. In Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp.
173-220). Academic Press.

147

Rubinstein, A. (1989). The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under” Almost
common knowledge”. The American Economic Review, 79(3), 385–391.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1806851
Rydval, O., & Ortmann, A. (2005). Loss avoidance as selection principle: Evidence from
simple stag-hunt games. Economics Letters, 88(1), 101–107.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.12.027
Sahin, S. G., Eckel, C., & Komai, M. (2015). An experimental study of leadership
institutions in collective action games. Journal of the Economic Science
Association, 1(1), 100–113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-015-0010-6
Sanna, L. J., & Turley, K. J. (1996). Antecedents to spontaneous counterfactual thinking:
Effects of expectancy violation and outcome valence. Personality & Social
Psychology Bulletin, 22(9), 906–919. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167296229005
Sanna, L. J., & Turley-Ames, K. J. (2000). Counterfactual intensity. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 30(2), 273-296. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)10990992(200003/04)30:2<273::AID-EJSP993>3.0.CO;2-Y
Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., & Wilson, C. (1994). A laboratory investigation of multiperson
rationality and presentation effects. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(3), 445–
468. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1026
Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of
affective states. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of
motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior: Vol. 2 (pp. 527-561).
New York: Guilford Press.

148

Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being:
Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 45(3), 513–523. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513
Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Lieder, F., Kool, W., Griffiths, T. L., Cohen, J. D., &
Botvinick, M. M. (2017). Toward a rational and mechanistic account of mental
effort. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 40, 99-124.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-072116-031526
Shenhav, A., Rand, D. G., & Greene, J. D. (2017). The relationship between
intertemporal choice and following the path of least resistance across choices,
preferences, and beliefs. Judgment and Decision Making, 12(1), 1–18.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2724547
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 69(1), 99-118. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884852
Smallman, R., & Summerville, A. (2018). Counterfactual thought in reasoning and
performance. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 12(4), e12376.
https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12376
Spence, M. (1978). Job market signaling. In P. Diamond & and M. Rothschild (Eds.),
Uncertainty in Economics (pp. 281-306). New York: Academic Press.
Sperber, D., Clement, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., & Wilson, D.
(2010). Epistemic vigilance. Mind & Language, 25(4), 359-393.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x

149

Stanovich, K. E. (2018). Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection,
override and mindware. Thinking & Reasoning, 24(4), 423-444.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2018.1459314
Stephens, D. W., & Krebs, J. R. (1986). Foraging theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Tangney, J. P., Baumeister, R. F., & Boone, A. L. (2004). High self‐control predicts good
adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success. Journal of
personality, 72(2), 271-324. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00263.x
Taylor, S. E. (1991). Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events: The
mobilization-minimization hypothesis. Psychological Bulletin, 110(1), 67–85.
https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/1991-32481-001
Thaler, R. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economics
letters, 8(3), 201-207. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7
Thaler, R. H., Sunstein, C. R., & Balz, J. P. (2013). Choice architecture. In E. Shafir
(Ed.), The behavioral foundations of public policy (pp. 428–439). New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and
metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63(3), 107-140.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001
Thompson, W. & Kaufmann, S. (2010). Signaling games with partially observable
actions as a model of conversational grounding. In proceedings of the 3rd AAAI
Conference on Interactive Decision Theory and Game Theory. AAAI Press.

150

Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011). The Cognitive Reflection Test as
a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory &
Cognition, 39(7), 1275-1289. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1
Trafton, J. G., Hiatt, L. M., Harrison, A. M., Tamborello, F. P., Khemlani, S. S., &
Schultz, A. C. (2013). Act-r/e: An embodied cognitive architecture for humanrobot interaction. Journal of Human-Robot Interaction, 2(1), 30-55.
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O. (1990). Tacit coordination games,
strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. The American Economic Review,
80(1), 234–248. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2006745
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O. (1991). Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium
selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 106(3), 885–910. https://doi.org/10.2307/2937932
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., & Beil, R. O. (1993). Asset markets as an equilibrium
selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit
communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(3), 485–504.
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1026
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, R. C., & Rankin, F. W. (2007). Evidence on learning in
coordination games. Experimental Economics, 10(3), 205–220.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9175-z
Van Huyck, J. B., Gillette, A. B., & Battalio, R. C. (1992). Credible assignments in
coordination games. Games and Economic Behavior, 4(4), 606–626.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90040-Y

151

Van Huyck, J. B., Wildenthal, J. M., & Battalio, R. C. (2002). Tacit cooperation, strategic
uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable
games. Games and Economic Behavior, 38(1), 156–175.
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0860
Walton, M. E., Kennerley, S. W., Bannerman, D. M., Phillips, P. E. M., & Rushworth, M.
F. (2006). Weighing up the benefits of work: behavioral and neural analyses of
effort-related decision making. Neural Networks, 19(8), 1302-1314.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2006.03.005
Weber, E. U., Johnson, E. J., Milch, K. F., Chang, H., Brodscholl, J. C., & Goldstein, D.
G. (2007). Asymmetric discounting in intertemporal choice: A query-theory
account. Psychological Science, 18(6), 516–523. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679280.2007.01932.x
Weber, R., Camerer, C., Rottenstreich, Y., & Knez, M. (2001). The illusion of leadership:
Misattribution of cause in coordination games. Organization Science, 12(5), 582–
598. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.12.5.582.10090
Westbrook, A., Kester, D., & Braver, T. S. (2013). What is the subjective cost of
cognitive effort? Load, trait, and aging effects revealed by economic preference.
Plos One, 9(7), e68210. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0068210
White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2005). Looking on the bright side: Downward
counterfactual thinking in response to negative life events. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 31(10), 1413-1424.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205276064

152

APPENDIX A
REMEG INSTRUCTIONS SCREENSHOTS

153

154

APPENDIX B
REMEG GAMEPLAY SCREENSHOTS - CHOICE OF 3 AND MINIMUM OF 1
Effort Selection and Arithmetic Problem

155

Results and Feedback

Upward Counterfactual - Choice

Upward Counterfactual - Minimum

156

Downward Counterfactual - Choice

157

